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RIP to IRP*- Money Laundering and Drug
Trafficking Controls Score a Knockout Victory
Over Bank Secrecy
Berta Esperanza Herndndez * *
Avidity To Punish Is Always Dangerous To Liberty [As it Leads A Nation] To
Stretch, Misinterpret, And To Misapply Even The Best of Laws. ***
I. Introduction
Privacy laws existed long before criminal elements began ex-
ploiting them by using avenues of international trade for drug traf-
ficking and money laundering activities. Indeed, such laws have long
served the legitimate purpose of protecting the right of persons and
businesses to keep their financial affairs private since "[t]he banking
transactions of an individual give a fairly accurate account of his reli-
gion, ideology, opinion and interest."' An example of "legitimate"
bank secrecy law protection was seen in the 1930s and 1940s when
such laws helped shield Jews from Nazi persecution.
Secrecy laws have served to shield persons from financial loss in
countries plagued by political instability, weak currencies and run-
away inflation rates. Secrecy laws have also served to protect wealthy
individuals or those who promote unpopular political causes by al-
lowing them to hide their assets to avoid the threat of kidnapping or
persecution. Unfortunately, privacy shields are also utilized by tax
cheats, drug traffickers and money launderers to penetrate legitimate
financial structures and to "launder" dirty money.
In the last decade, global concerns regarding drug trafficking
and money laundering 2 have intensified. Currently, it is estimated
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• ** United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (Stevens,J., dissenting) quot-
ing 2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945).
1 California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2 Money laundering is defined as "the process by which one conceals the existence,
illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it
236 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. [VOL. 18
that drug profits of $300 billion United States dollars are laundered
each year through the international banking system. Sales within
the United States alone generate $110 billion in illegal drug pro-
ceeds. 4 In response to these figures and the problem they represent,
international cooperation has blossomed and nations have joined
ranks to curb drug trafficking.5 Yet, while the elimination of drug
trafficking and the money laundering it occasions is a desirable goal,
the efforts to date have had the undesirable effect of eroding individ-
uals' right to privacy as bank secrecy protections have yielded to the
government's need to obtain information for anti-drug enforcement
efforts.6
The basic philosophy of bank secrecy regulation requires banks
and financial institutions to keep confidential any information con-
cerning their clients' property. 7 The purpose is to protect the pri-
vacy of the individual and the privacy interest of the customer.8 An
unfortunate occurrence, however, is that bank secrecy laws often in-
terfere with investigations of economic and other crimes. Notably,
the United States has tried to overcome the protection provided by
appear legitimate." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY LAUNDERING 13 (1984) [hereinafter THE CASH CON-
NECTION]. There are three stages to the money laundering process: placement, layering
and integration. See Paul Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money From Reaching The Wash Cycle: A Guide
To The Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING LJ. 230, 231 (1991). These stages are described
more particularly as:
Placement is the physical disposal of bulk cash proceeds into a financial insti-
tution. Layering is the process of transferring these funds among various
accounts through a series of complex financial transactions that are intended,
to the greatest extent possible, to separate these funds from their original
sources. Finally, integration is the process of shifting the laundered funds to
legitimate organizations that have no apparent link to organized crime.
Id.; see also, Charles Intriago, INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING - A EUROSTUDY SPECIAL
REPORT 7-13 (1991) [hereinafter Intriago, EUROSTUDY]. While the origin of the term
"money laundering" is uncertain, instances where people sought to conceal and disguise
illegal income can be traced to biblical times. Id. at 1 (quoting Act 5, Verses I through 11
of the Bible).
3 REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE SUBCOMM. OF NARCOTICS, TERRORISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
4 Id.; see also Address by Attorney General Richard Thornborough to the American
Bankers Association (October 26, 1989) (noting that the annual gross income from drug
sales in the United States is estimated at over $100 billion).
5 See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, UN Doc. El CONF. 82/15 and rev. 1, adopted by consensus Dec. 19,
1988; reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter UN Drug Convention]; See also infra
notes 280-296 and accompanying text (explaining purposes of UN Drug Convention and
listing member states) and infra notes 219-228 and accompanying text (on bilateral mutual
legal assistance treaties entered into by United States and various countries); see generally,
David Stewart, Internationalizing The War On Drugs: The UN Drug Convention Against Illicit
Traffic In Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 18 DEN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 387 (1992)
(tracing international efforts in the war on drugs).
6 See, e.g., UN Drug Convention supra note 5.
7 Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control
Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAWYER 69 (1988).
8 Id.
1993] INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
bank secrecy in anti-trust investigations 9 including investigations of
the shipping industry' 0 and uranium cartels," Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") investigations, 12 and money launder-
ing and drug trafficking investigations.' 3 Such investigations have
created conflicts with foreign sovereigns, particularly when the
United States has asserted the right to investigate extraterritorially.14
Other sovereigns, in response, have asserted their rights to enforce
their country's bank secrecy laws.
Significantly, the United States has a Bank Secrecy Act' 5 (BSA)
which, in light of the traditional secrecy concepts, is somewhat of a
misnomer. Rather than protecting the individual's privacy, the BSA
requires financial institutions to keep records concerning their cli-
ents' business affairs and to report certain types of transactions to
the government.' 6 To be sure, the United States recognizes some
limited degree of individuals' right to privacy in banking as codified
in the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA).' 7 In reality, however,
the RFPA does not offer much privacy protection. Instead, it simply
permits financial institutions to advise their customers that the gov-
ernment has requested financial records so as to afford the customer
an opportunity to challenge the government's request. Moreover,
9 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
10 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
I1 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., infra note 18 and accompanying text.
14 The United States' aggressive claim of right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
reached new heights. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 .S.Ct. 2188 (1992), the
Supreme Court upheld a claim of jurisdiction over a citizen and resident of Mexico who
was forcibly kidnapped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas where he was
arrested for his participation in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministrator (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. The respondent's (a doctor) participation
was believed to be in prolonging the DEA's agent's life so that others could torture and
interrogate him. The District Court (United States v. Caro Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599
(C.D.C.A. 1990)) concluded that the DEA agents were responsible for the abduction and
dismissed the indictment as violative of the Extradition-Treaty between the U.S. and Mex-
ico. The Court of Appeals (946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)) affirmed the find-
ing that jurisdiction was improper because the United States had authorized the
kidnapping and Mexico protested the Treaty violation. The Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's holding that the kidnapping did not prohibit trial in the United States for
violation of United States criminal law. The court noted that when a treaty is not involved,
a court properly may exercise jurisdiction even though it is obtained by a forcible abduc-
tion. The Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding (a) this state's abduction of and
their sovereign state's citizen, (b) which was carried out by violating the other sovereign's
territorial integrity, and (c) in a situation in which an extradition treaty was in place.
15 The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1114 (1970) [hereinafter Bank Secrecy Act] (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1988) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-24).
16 Title I of the Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. contains record- keeping provisions requir-
ing banks and other financial institutions to retain financial records for up to five years.
Title II, codified at 31 U.S.C. contains the reporting requirements.
17 Financial Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat.
3641 (1978) [hereinafter RFPA] (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3402), see also infra notes
72-92 and accompanying text (describing purposes and requirements of RFPA).
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exceptions with respect to the institution's obligation to notify cus-
tomers about such requests all but render the limited RFPA protec-
tions illusory at best.
With the emergence of international cooperation in the fight
against drug trafficking and money laundering, the long embraced
principle of bank secrecy, along with the individuals' right to privacy
it protected, ceded to the interests of global anti-drug enforce-
ment.1 8 Significantly, this author's concern with the erosion of inter-
national rights is not to seek protection for criminal elements such as
drug traffickers and money launderers. Rather, the concern is about
the many innocent persons who get caught in the broad net that gov-
ernments throw to catch the wrongdoers. Because of the evolution
of strict regulations that often are stacked in the government's favor
and the increased use of indicia checklists to ascertain the wrongful-
ness of conduct, innocent persons are virtually defenseless and un-
fairly suffer.
The impact on individual rights is extensive because "dirty"
money travels extensively. For example, dirty money passes freely in
the Caribbean states of Antigua, Anguilla, the Bahamas, the Cayman
Islands, Montserrat, and the Netherlands Antilles.' 9 In Europe, dirty
money is believed to pass through Andorra, the Channel Islands, Gi-
braltar, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland. 20 In the Far
East, both Hong Kong and Singapore are known to be money laun-
dering sites2' and in the Middle East, Dubai and the United Arab
Emirates are the known locales. 22 In Latin America, the states most
known for money laundering are Colombia, Mexico and Panama, 23
although many fear that money laundering is growing in other South
American countries. In the United States, the cities targeted for
money laundering activity are Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami,
New York and San Francisco. 24
To trace money laundering, governments collect and use infor-
mation from financial institutions on individuals. However, absent
global money laundering initiatives, the disclosure of such informa-
tion by institutions would constitute a violation of the customers' fi-
nancial privacy rights and would subject the institution and its
employees to civil and/or criminal liability.
18 See, e.g., UN Drug Convention, supra note 5.
19 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report, April 1988 [herein-
after National Narcotics Report]; see also, Staff of Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations
of Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Crime and Secrecy, The
Use of Offshore Banks and Companies 7 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter Staff Subcomm.
Report].
20 Staff Subcomm. Report, supra note 19.
21 Staff Subcomm. Report, supra note 19.
22 National Narcotics Report supra note 19.
23 National Narcotics Report, supra note 19.
24 National Narcotics Report, supra note 19.
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This Article reviews the evolution of bank secrecy laws and com-
ments on the erosion of rights effected by the domestic and interna-
tional efforts to curb drug trafficking and money laundering. Part II
reviews the evolution of bank secrecy laws in the international sphere
and views the origins of the individuals' right to financial privacy.
Specifically, Part II focuses on the laws of Switzerland and England
to show the bases and proliferation of secrecy protections. Part III
provides the background of the status of financial privacy in the
United States. The following two parts describe initiatives aimed at
eliminating drug trafficking and related money laundering. Part IV
presents United States' domestic legislative actions, enforcement ef-
forts, and international initiatives by way of bilateral agreements.
Part V discusses both foreign domestic and international efforts.
Part VI presents a hypothetical case study in an effort to show
that the pendulum has swung too far in eroding individuals' right of
privacy, thus trammeling on the rights of innocent individuals. The
hypothetical considers the effects of United States' civil forfeiture
provisions - provisions becoming increasingly common in interna-
tional laws - which give the government broad powers to seize any
property that is "traceable proceeds."'25 These provisions also
shackle the individual owner of seized property by shifting to that
owner the burden of proving that the property was not illegally ob-
tained instead of requiring the government to establish the owner's
wrongdoing or culpability.2 6 The hypothetical case also shows the
25 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4)(A)(B) (1988). In short, this provision provides that all proceeds "traceable" to
a drug transaction shall be forfeited to the United States. See United States v. One 1976
Ford F-150, 599 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Mo. 1984). The analogue sections for such forfeiture
under the money laundering statute are 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)(A) (1988) ("any property
traceable to . . . property involved in a money laundering transaction") and 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(l)(B) ("any property ... derived from, or traceable to, any proceeds obtained
directly or indirectly from an offense against a foreign nation involving the manufacture,
importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance..."); see also United States v.
Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986) (providing detailed discussion on
what constitutes traceable proceeds).
26 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A)-(C). These provisions provide what is known as the "in-
nocent owner" defense to civil forfeiture under section 881; see generally, e.g., United States
v. 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989) (under section 881 an innocent owner is
one who neither knew nor consented to the illegal act); see also infra notes 192-194 and
accompanying text (explaining the innocent owner exception). Once the government has
established probable cause (see infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text, describing the
probable cause requirement) to believe that property is subject to forfeiture under section
881, the burden then shifts to the claimant to establish his innocent ownership in order to
avoid forfeiture. See United States v. One 1987 Mercedes 560, SEL, 919 F.2d 327, 331
(5th Cir. 1990) (once government shows probable cause, burden is on claimant to prove
that property is not subject to forfeiture). In essence, a showing of probable cause creates
a presumption that the property is "guilty" and then the claimant must prove that it is
"innocent." See United States v. One 1974 Porsche 911-S, 682 F.2d 283, 285 (1st Cir.
1982) (after government establishes probable cause, claimant has burden of proving inno-
cence). It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a defendant is innocent until
proven guilty. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) whereas under civil forfeiture laws
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dangerous effects of the trend to prove wrongfulness of conduct
based on indicia, rather than on actual proof of wrongdoing.
This author concludes that matters have come full circle: from
near total bank secrecy and privacy protection to virtual full disclo-
sure. While these latter requirements have been instituted pursuant
to well-intended domestic laws and international agreements aimed
at the eradication of drug trafficking and money laundering, these
efforts have gone too far and have resulted in the curtailment of indi-
viduals' privacy rights. Consequently, this author proposes as an al-
ternative, a more balanced approach that can achieve the goal of
curbing the nefarious conduct without trammeling individual privacy
rights.
II. Bank Secrecy Laws in the International Sphere - The
Individual's Right to Financial Privacy
The individual right to privacy, as articulated in myriad interna-
tional human rights agreements, is an international human right.27
This right to privacy, as evidenced by the bank secrecy protections
extends to financial matters. This part briefly sets out the history of
the bank secrecy laws. It explores the evolution of bank secrecy by
presenting two examples of bank secrecy jurisdictions - Switzer-
land, a civil law country and the quintessential secrecy jurisdiction,
and England, a common law country.
A. Switzerland
In Switzerland, as in other civil law countries, the right to pri-
vacy is a fundamental right protected both in criminal and civil law.28
The sphere of privacy encompasses both the right to intellectual, in-
property is presumed guilty until proven innocent. David Smith, Prosecution and Defense
of Forfeiture Cases P 11.03 (1990); see also, Civil Forfeiture of Property for Drug Offenders
Under Illinois and Federal Statute: Zero Tolerance, Zero Exceptions, 25 JOHN MARSHALL
L. REV. 389, 414 (1992) (labelling result of civil forfeiture "penal" and suggesting that
property should be innocent until proven guilty). The corresponding innocent owner ex-
ception under the money laundering statute is 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2).
27 See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217
A (III), U.N. Doc. A/A to 10, at art. 12 (1948) ("no one shall be subject to arbitrary inter-
ference in his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . ."); International Covenant on
Civil Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) a, U.N.Doc. a/6316, at art. 17 (1966) ("no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy..."); European
Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 8 x 1); Council of Europe, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (1954)("everyone
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence
. . ."); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 11, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/ser 4 V/II 23, Doc. 21, rev. 2 (English ed. 1975) ("no one may be the object of
arbitrary or a piece of interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his corre-
spondence ...").
28 See, e.g., Pieter Hoets & Sara Zwart, Swiss Bank Secrecy and The Marcos Affair, 9 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. ITrr'L & COMP. L. 75 (1988) [hereinafter Hoets & Zwart].
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corporeal existence, health, family life and financial affairs2 9 and the
right to economic privacy of partnerships, associations, and business
secrets.30 With respect to financial affairs, secrecy laws prohibit
banks from disclosing information regarding clients' accounts to
third parties.3 1 Significantly, in Switzerland, where bank secrecy is a
cornerstone of the economy, 32 the nz-ure of a banker's relationship
to his/her customer is analogous to the private nature of the rela-
tionship of a lawyer to a client, a doctor to a patient, or a confessor to
a penitent.33
The Swiss right of financial privacy is particularly significant be-
cause of that country's long history of neutrality.3 4 Evidence of the
strong Swiss adherence to neutrality spans its 16th Century position
in the conflict between France and Austria;3 5 its 17th Century status
as a religious safe haven;36 and its stance in the 18th Century during
the French Revolution.3 7 In the 19th Century, when Europe was
plagued by wars, Switzerland's neutrality was recognized as an inte-
gral part of European international law. Swiss neutrality was
respected during the Italian and German unification and during the
two World Wars.3 8 In fact, Swiss neutrality during the Second
World War was a significant factor in creating a universal willingness
to recognize the use of bank secrecy laws to block Nazi attempts to
gather financial information about German Jews and was supported
world-wide.3 9
Until 1934, custom and usage governed Swiss bank secrecy
29 Hermine Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 284, 287 (1955); see also Nancy Sipp, Bank Secrecy Laws in Discovery: Did
Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommidity Services, Inc. Adopt an Overly Deferential Approach? 14 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 443, 457 n.75 (1988).
30 Id.
31 Swiss Banking Secrecy laws cover "all actions in the banking domain, including the
relationship between client and bank, information given by the client above his financial
circumstances, the client's relationship with other banks, if any, and the bank's own trans-
action, if disclosure would harm a customer." Maurice Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking
Secrecy Under Domestic and International Law, 2 INT'L TAx & Bus. L. 273, 276 (1984).
Secrecy laws are based on an individual's constitutional right to privacy and can be
waived by agreement. Klaus Moessle, The Basic Structure of United States Securities Law En-
forcement in International Cases, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 21 (1986). See also, John Fedders et.
al., Waiver by Conduct - A Possible Response to the Internationalization of the Securities Market, 6J.
CoMp. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 1, 30-35 (1983) ( an excellent overview of secrecy laws).
32 Sipp, supra note 29, at 457.
33 Meyer, supra note 29, at 288-89.
34 See generally Hoets & Zwart, supra note 28, at 75.
35 See Hoets & Zwart, supra note 28, at 75 n.3.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 R. BLUM, OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS, AND COMPANIES: THE BUSINESS OF
CRIME IN THE EUROMARKET 13 (1984); see also, Andrew Connick & William Roth, Subpoenas
of Overseas Bank Records: Getting Out of The Middle - A Message to Bank Counsel, 9 N.Y.L. ScH.J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 131 n.4 (1988) [hereinafter Connick].
1993]
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laws.40 In this context, a violation of secrecy subjected the wrong-
doer to civil liability in tort law. 41 In 1934, coinciding with the col-
lapse of the Banque D'Ecompte Suisse42 and the commencement of
the troubles with the Nazis,43 Switzerland enacted statutory bank se-
crecy laws 44 which added criminal sanctions to the already available
private civil remedies. 45 Later, in 1937, the Penal Code was enacted
which provided criminal penalties for disclosing business secrets. 46
Article 47 of the Swiss banking code specifically prohibits disclo-
sure of any secrets entrusted to a person in his/her capacity as an
officer of a bank.47 The bankers' obligation to secrecy has two ba-
ses. First, it is based on personality rights - fundamental principles
which include the invulnerability of privacy. 48 Second, the duties of
the banker are grounded on bank law49 and on agency law princi-
ples. 50 Thus banking law, which criminalizes secrecy violations, can
result in civil liability under both tort law5 1 and banking law 52 as well
40 Sipp, supra note 29, at 457; "Custom and usage" is defined as:
[a] usage or practice of the people, which, by common adoption and acquies-
cence, and by long and unvarying habit, has become compulsory, and has
acquired the force of a law with respect to the place or subject-matter to
which it relates. It results from a long series of actions, constantly repeated,
which have, by such repetition and by uninterrupted acquiescence, acquired
the force of a tacit and common consent.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
41 Meyer, supra note 29, at 288.
42 Walter Meir, Banking Secrecy in Swiss and International Taxation, 7 INT'L LAw 17
(1983); see also, Sipp, supra note 29, at 457; Gregory Raifman, The Effect Of The U.S.-Swiss
Agreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565, 573
(1983)
43 Id.
44 Bundesgesetz uber die Banken und Sparkassen, Des of Nov. 8, 1934, as amended
by Federal Law of March 11, 1971.
45 Sipp, supra note 29, at 458 n.84. Specifically, Article 47 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, in his capacity as officer, executor, employee, agent, liquidator,
trustee, bank commissioner or auditor, reveals any secret entrusted to him or
which he learned in his capacity and whoever attempts to incite others to
violate the professional secret, shall be punished by a maximum of 6 months
imprisonment or by a fine not exceeding 50,000 francs.
46 Sipp, supra note 29, at 458.
47 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48 Peter Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the
United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 2 (1983)
[hereinafter Honegger].
49 Id
50 Code des Obligations (C.O.) Art. 396(2) (Switz.). The banker's discretion here
derives from his contractual obligations. This contractual duty is either express or im-
plied. Honegger, supra note 48, at 2.
51 C.O. Art. 41(1); Article 41 subsection I of the Swiss Obligation Code provides
"Whoever unlawfully causes damage to another, whether willfully or negligently, shall be
liable for damages." Id. Therefore, to maintain a cause of action in tort against the bank,
the customer must prove:
(a) the damages were sustained by the banker's disclosure;
(b) negligence or willfulness of the banker;
(c) cause in fact and proximate course; and
(d) the illegality of the disclosure, which is imminent absent either a legal
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as liability to criminal sanctions.5 3 In all cases, Switzerland places a
high premium on privacy and confidentiality. Significantly, the client
is the master of the secret. 54
B. England
In England, eleven years before the Swiss enacted Article 47, the
Kings Bench Division of the Court of Appeals wrote the trail- blazing
decision on the right to financial privacy. In Tournier v. National Pro-
vincial and Union Bank of England,55 the court established that a bank
owes an implied contractual duty to its customer not to disclose any
customer's information to third parties. 56 Aside from its own prece-
dential value within England, Tournier established the foundation for
many bank secrecy laws around the world. 57 The former British col-
onies that adopted the common law of England, such as the Bahamas
and Canada, inherited and incorporated into their own laws the Eng-
lish law of bank secrecy. 58 Similarly, jurisdictions that remain colo-
nies or protectorates of England such as Hong Kong, the Cayman
provision or a client's waiver permitting the bank to give information to third
parties.
See Honegger, supra note 48, at 3.
52 C.O. Art. 97(1). Article 97 subsection 1 of the Swiss Obligation Code states "If the
performance of an obligation cannot at all or not duly be effected, the obligor shall com-
pensate for damages arising therefrom, unless he proves that no fault at all is attributable
to him." Id. Specifically, to bring this action the client must establish:
(a) the damages were sustained by the banker's disclosure;
(b) breach of contract, i.e. disclosure; and
(c) cause in fact and proximate cause.
See Honegger, supra note 48, at 3.
53 C.O. Art. 47(1) and (2). Under Swiss law criminal sanctions will be imposed
whether the disclosure is intentional or negligent. Id. Intentional disclosure is punishable
by imprisonment and or a fine not exceeding 50,000 francs. C.O. Art. 47(1). Negligent
disclosure is punishable by a fine of up to 30,000 francs. C.O. Art. 47(2). See also, Honeg-
ger, supra note 48, at 3.
54 Honegger, supra note 48, at 4.
55 Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of Eng., [1924] 1. K.B. 461 (C.A.). In
Tournier, an employee sued his bank for defamation and breach of an implied contract of
confidentiality because the bank disclosed that he had failed to honor a check to his book-
maker. Id. at 463, 475. As a result of the bank's disclosure, the employee's contract was
not renewed. Id. at 475. At the trial level, the jury found in favor of the bank, but the
court reversed on appeal, finding a confidential relationship between the parties. Id. at
461-75.
56 Id. at 475. Tournier also listed four exceptions to bank secrecy. Banker's have a
limited secrecy duty "(a) [w]here disclosure is under compulsion by law; (b) where there is
a duty to the public to disclose; (c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure; [and]
(d) where disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer." Id. at
473. For a general overview of the English exceptions to secrecy, see Danforth Newcomb,
United States Litigation and Foreign Bank Secrecy: The Origins of Conflict, 9 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 47, 55 (1988) [hereinafter Newcomb].
57 Newcomb, supra note 56, at 48.
58 Bank and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment) Act, No. 3 (1980) (Baha-
mas); Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, No. 16; see generally Newcomb, supra
note 56, at 49, 56-57 (outlining statutory adoption of English bank secrecy laws by British
colonies).
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Islands, and the Channel Islands, all significant banking centers that
are regarded as tax havens, 59 also follow the English law.
Indeed, the Cayman Islands, whose bank secrecy laws stem from
the Tournier decision, provide a good example of the problem ad-
dressed in this article. In 1964, only two banks and no offshore busi-
nesses existed in the Cayman Islands. By 1981, however, the
Caymans boasted 306 branches of United States and foreign banks,
and over 8,000 registered companies. 60 Through its convenient lo-
cation close to Miami, its well developed bank secrecy laws inherited
from England, its tax free status, and its political stability as a British
dependency, 6' the Caymans have evolved into one of the prime se-
crecy havens in the Western world. 62 Much dirty drug money is be-
lieved to travel through the Caymans.
Luxembourg is another secrecy jurisdiction that serves to under-
score the potential problems and conflicts that exist between bank
secrecy laws and the fight against drug trafficking and money laun-
dering. 63 Presently, Luxembourg is thought to rival Switzerland in
total bank deposits. 64 At a time when most governments are enact-
ing laws to erode banking and business confidentiality in order to
fight international crime, Luxembourg has enacted new provisions
forbidding its banks to disclose information to any local and foreign
tax authorities, although recent legislation punishes hiding the ori-
gin of funds derived from the sale of illegal drugs.65
From this review of the history of bank secrecy laws, two things
become clear. First, bank secrecy rules are deeply grounded in tradi-
tion and are intended to protect individuals' privacy rights in legiti-
mate circumstances, often against oppressive governmental
intrusion. Second, criminals have access to these laws and use them
as swords to penetrate the legitimate international financial system
and as shields against government detection of illegitimate activity.
The growing problem of drug trafficking and money laundering has
made it necessary for states to pierce these privacy protections in
order to curtail crime. Inevitably, these two concerns - governmen-
tal action against crime and individuals' traditional right to financial
privacy - conflict.
59 Newcomb, supra note 56, at 49.
60 Ethan A. Nadelmann, Negotiations in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 Am. J. COMP.
L. 467, 499 (1985).
61 William C. Gilmore, International Action Against Drug Trafficking: Trends in United King-
dom Law and Practice, 24 INr'L L. 365, 379-80 (1990).
62 Id. at 380.
63 Charles A. Intriago, Nations Act To Dam Up Illicit Funds: Governments Enact Legislation
Designed to Deny A Safe Haven to Dirty Money, AMERICAN BANKER, July 24, 1989, at 22.
64 Id.
65 Bruce A. Zagaris & Marcus Bornheim, Cooperation In Fight Against Money Laundering
In Context of European Community Integration, 54 BNA's BANKING REP. 119, 121 (1990).
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III. The Right to Financial Privacy in the United States
The United States' concept of financial privacy is radically differ-
ent from that described above. This divergence historically has been
the basis of bitter conflicts between the United States and other sov-
ereigns. Subsection A describes the United States' legal protection
of privacy which is, in reality, illusory. Thereafter, Subsection B sets
forth the history of the clashes over privacy caused by the United
States' idiosyncratic views.
A. The United States' Financial Privacy Law
Prior to 1970, a small number of judicial decisions recognized
and supported bank secrecy in the United States.6 6 However, the
enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act 67 led to the demise of any notion
of financial privacy. 68 Notwithstanding the patent invasion of privacy
effected by the BSA's record-keeping and reporting requirements,
the Supreme Court, addressing a Fourth Amendment challenge, up-
held the Act's constitutionality. 69 In California Bankers Association v.
Schultz, 70 the Court concluded that once an individual provides
records to a bank, the information belongs to the bank; the individ-
ual retains no privacy right or expectation with respect to any such
information. 7' Thus, after Schultz, the United States' position that
banks, a highly regulated government industry, are the owner of
their clients' financial information represents the diametric opposite
of bank secrecy jurisdictions where the client is the owner of the
information.
In response to perceived governmental abuse of the record-
keeping and reporting requirements as a means to obtain individu-
als' financial records, Congress passed the RFPA 72 which provides
whatever right to financial privacy that exists in the United States. 73
Congress recognized that financial institutions' customers have the
66 See, e.g., Sparks v. Union Trust Co., 124 S.E.2d 365 (1962); Peterson v. Idaho First
Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34 (1929).
67 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829B, 1951-1959. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002; 31 U.S.C. §§ 321,
5311-5314, 5316-5322; see also, Newcomb, supra note 56, at 50 (reviewing the background
of the Bank Secrecy Act).
68 To call this legislation a secrecy act is wholly cynical. Rather than aiming at the
protection of information, the BSA is a record-keeping and reporting statute. See infra
notes 129-153 and accompanying text (describing regulations).
69 California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
70 Id. at 21.
71 Id. at 48-49. See also supra notes 129-147 and accompanying text (illustrating the
use of bank records to detect money laundering).
72 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); see also infra notes 72-92 and ac-
companying text (describing purposes and requirements of RFPA).
73 Government abuse was increased by the Bank Secrecy Act. Two Supreme Court
decisions which upheld the constitutionality of the Act also contributed to government
abuse. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976); see also Plombeck, supra note 7, at 94 (recognizing that the RFPA was
enacted to restore privacy rights in light of the restrictive interpretation of the fourth
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right to expect that their financial activities receive a reasonable
amount of protection from scrutiny by the federal government.
However, the perceived right to privacy provided by the law is illu-
sory. The RFPA simply requires that a financial institution notify its
customer prior to providing the information that the government has
requested 74 so that the customer has an opportunity to challenge the
request. 75
Ironically, the RFPA, which was supposedly passed in reaction
to the erosion of privacy and in order to re-institute privacy protec-
tions, sets forth the very procedures that provide the government
access to financial records. 76 Under the Act, the government can ob-
tain financial records of the customer of a financial institution in six
different ways: (1) pursuant to a written consent of the customer; 77
(2) pursuant to a search warrant; 78 (3) pursuant to an administrative
amendment by the Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy
Act).
Even before Miller was decided, Congress reacted to the potential for abuse of finan-
cial privacy with the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-519, 88 Stat. 1896,
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988 & Supp. I 1990). Under this Act, the Privacy Protection Study
Commission (Commission) was formed to examine the needs of government to acquire
information about it's citizens. Id. The commission's report, finding the strongest threat
to individual privacy coming from the government, recommended that Congress enact
privacy legislation which could meet the following objectives:
(1) minimize intrusiveness;
(2) maximize fairness; and
(3) create legitimate and enforceable expectations of confidentiality.
Id.
Notwithstanding the fact that Miller found that an individual has no privacy interest in
his financial records, the court recognized that Congress could still pass contrary legisla-
tion, affording individuals greater rights beyond those granted by the Constitution.
Zurcher v. Stanford Dailes, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978). Ultimately, Congress responded by
enacting the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422.
74 Id. § 3403.
75 Id. § § 3405, 3410. When a customer challenges government access to his records,
the customer must show some factual basis supporting the allegation that the records are
not being sought for a legitimate purpose. See H.R. REP. No. 95-138, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9325. However, the government has the ultimate
burden of proving it has a right to access to the records. Id. The RFPA establishes proce-
dures for government authorities which seek information from a financial institution about
a customer's financial records and imposes limitations and duties on financial institutions
prior to the release of information sought by government agencies. In this context, it
merely provides the customer the opportunity to contest access to his or her records. Id.
The RFPA requires a customer who wants to challenge the government's access to her/his
records to file a motion to quash an administrative summons or judicial subpoena or to file
an application to enjoin the government from obtaining his records in accordance with a
written request within 10 days of service or 14 days of mailing of the subpoena, summons
or written request. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a).
76 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422. For a discussion of the exceptions, see generally, Allen,
What To Do When the Government Comes Knocking: Account Holder Subpoenas And Freeze Orders,
1991 MONEY LAUNDERING ENFORCEMENT UPDATE: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES
COURSE MATERIALS 259.
77 12 U.S.C. § 3404. It is the position of the Department of Justice that any named
account holder ofjoint account may authorize access to the account without the consent of
the other holder.
78 Id. § 3406. A search warrant issued in accordance with the provisions of Rule 41 of
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subpoena; 79 (4) pursuant to a formal written request;80 (5) pursuant
to ajudicial subpoena;8' or (6) pursuant to a grand jury subpoena.8 2
Yet, even these meager confidentiality protections do not apply
when a financial institution voluntarily opts to report suspected vio-
lations of a statute or a regulation reflected in records within its cus-
tody.8 3  Moreover, the financial institution can notify the
government of its suspicions without any liability to the individual
upon whose financial privacy the reporting intrudes and regardless
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can be used to obtain financial records. It is only
within three months after the execution of the search warrant that the government must
notify the affected customer or customers of the search. Id. § 3406(b). However, such
customer notice may be delayed, and the bank prohibited from notifying the customer of
the search, if a court order is obtained pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3409. Id. § 3406(c). A
delay order is granted for a period of three months and may be extended by application to
the same court which issued the original subpoena. Id. A delay order may be obtained on
the grounds of "reasonable belief," which is a lesser standard than probable cause, that
notification would (a) endanger the life or physical safety of any person, or (b) result in
flight from prosecution, or (c) result in the destruction of or tampering with evidence, or
result in the intimidation of a potential witness, or (e) unduly delay a trial or judicial pro-
ceedings, or (f) otherwise seriously jeopardize an investigation or official proceeding. Id.
79 Id. § 3405. This is a judicially enforceable demand for records issued by a govern-
mental authority which is authorized by statute to issue such process. Id. Pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 876, the Attorney General can issue administrative subpoenas in any investiga-
tion involving controlled substances, and this authority has been re-delegated through the
administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration through its chief counsel to special
agents in charge, assistant special agents in charge, and resident agents in charge. When-
ever an administrative subpoena is issued it will be served by the responsible agency on
the financial institution, and notice thereof must be provided to the customer by personal
service of a copy of the subpoena, or by mailing a copy of the subpoena to her/his last
known address, and the customer is provided ten days from the date of personal service,
or fourteen days from the date of mailing to contest the administrative action. Id. No
records are to be produced until the applicable time period has expired and the concerned
agency provides a certification of compliance with the terms of the act. However, delay
orders can be obtained from courts of competent jurisdiction in appropriate circum-
stances. The records obtained pursuant to administrative subpoena may be transferred by
the DEA to other agencies within the Department ofJustice, and to state, local or foreign
governments, subject to the provisions of the Privacy Act 74, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
80 12 U.S.C. § 3408. This is a new formal process which is intended to allow govern-
mental authorities not authorized to issue administrative summons or subpoenas the op-
portunity to request records in a formal manner. Id. The customer is entitled to the same
time period within which to challenge the request, as provided for an administrative sub-
poena, but unlike that procedure s/he is not under an obligation to honor the request of
access to the records. Id.
81 Id. § 3407. These include any formal court order to produce records other than a
grand jury subpoena. Id. § 3413(i). The most common form of judicial subpoenas are
trial subpoenas, issued for financial records of a customer who is not a party to the legal
proceeding. The customer is entitled to the period specified within which to challenge the
order to produce the records, and a financial institution should not produce records until
the applicable time periods have expired, or a delay order is issued and presented. Id.
§ 3407. The concerned agency must present a certification of compliance before the fi-
nancial institution is required to produce any records. The standard for issuing a judicial
subpoena is a showing of reasonable belief that the records sought are relevant to a legiti-
mate law enforcement inquiry.
82 Id. § 3413(i). The provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) except from the operation of
the Act subpoenas issued by federal grand juries, except for certain provisions concerning
the handling of records once they have been obtained. Id.
83 Id. § 3403(c).
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of whether the activity reported is actually a violation of law.84
The reporting in which an institution voluntarily can engage is
broad. The information that a financial institution may provide to
the government includes the name of the account holder, the ac-
count number, the nature of the suspected illegal activity, the dates
of the transactions in question, and whatever other information is
necessary to enable law enforcement authorities to initiate an investi-
gation of the suspected offense. The only true limitation on financial
institutions is that they may not turn over or verbally disclose the
contents of customers' financial records.
Significantly, recent amendments to the RFPA mandate that, in
certain instances, the financial institution not reveal to its customers
that their records are being reviewed.8 5 For example, a financial in-
84 Id. Specifically, under this section, a financial institution "shall not be liable to the
customer" for disclosing suspected criminal activity. Id. An institution is given a "good
faith defense" for providing voluntary disclosure. Id. § 3417(c). The Bank Secrecy Act
imposes substantial reporting requirements on financial institutions, including reporting
of known or suspected violations. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.11. (1992). In that section, the
comments to the regulation provide that if "a question exists as to whether to report an
incident, OCC recommends that a criminal referral be submitted providing at least the
nature of the transaction, relevant account numbers and the identities of those suspected."
Id.
In 1986, Congress amended the RFPA, 12 USC § 3403(c), to provide a limited safe
harbor from civil liability for disclosure of customer-identification information in a crimi-
nal referral to law enforcement. See S. REP. No. 433, 99th Congress, 2d Sess. 15 (1986); cf
Young v. United States, 882 F.2d 637 (2nd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990)
(assuming RFPA exempts "tips" from customer privacy laws). Legislation passed by the
House in 1991, H.R. 26, would further amend RFPA Section 3403(c) to provide banks
with immunity from civil suit for refusing to do business with a customer after making a
"good faith criminal referral on that customer."
Treasury has issued guidelines to all bank regulatory agencies directing them to refer
BSA violations for civil or criminal penalties. See FHLBB Regulatory Bulletin, 400 RB 8
(Dec. 13, 1988). Also, the 1988 drug bill amended the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12
U.S.C. § 3412, to authorize federal bank regulatory agencies to disclose RFPA-protected
records to the Department ofJustice (DOJ) upon supervisory certification that the records
may be relevant to a federal criminal law violation and were obtained in the agency's exer-
cise of its regulatory functions. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.. 100-690,
§ 6186(b), 102 Stat. 4181, 4357-58 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3412(f)
(1988)). DOJ may use those records only for criminal investigative or prosecutive pur-
poses. Id.
85 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i). Thus, the 1986 Money Laundering and Control Act
Amendments created exceptions to instances when the institutions may notify its custom-
ers regarding a government request for financial information. This amendment mandates
that a financial institution delay notifying their customer of a grand jury subpoena or an-
other related court order. Id. The purpose behind this provision was to avoid decreasing
grand jury secrecy as a result of the customer notice protections of the RFPA. The draft-
ers believed the grand jury to be the single most effective investigative tool in criminal law
enforcement. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 246, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9376; see also, 12 U.S.C. § 3413(1) which exempts the requirement to
notify "insiders" of financial institutions and which permits a financial institution or a su-
pervisory agency to provide to law enforcement agencies the financial records of any of-
ficer, director, employee, or controlling shareholder of the institution whenever there is
reason to believe that such records are relevant to possible criminal activity in which the
person might be engaged, involving a financial institution or supervisory agency, including
violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id. The House Committee noted that this amendment
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stitution was not initially required to notify its customer that the gov-
ernment was seeking financial records when the information request
was pursuant to a court order or a grand jury subpoena.8 6 Later, the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA) amended RFPA and prohibited a financial institution
from notifying any person named in a grand jury subpoena about the
subpoena. 87 Moreover, the RFPA allows the government to seek a
court order to delay the ordinarily required notice to the customer.
The Act specifically allows delay in notification of the customer if
there is a reason to believe that such notice will result in the endan-
germent of the life of a person, in flight from prosecution, in the
destruction or tampering with evidence, in intimidation of potential
witnesses, or in otherwise placing the investigation in serious
jeopardy. 88
Finally, there are four statutorily defined situations in which the
Act is inapplicable and, consequently, require no disclosure notice
and no waiting period prior to disclosure, even though the govern-
ment neither seeks nor receives a delay order: (1) the litigation ex-
ception;8 9 (2) the "account identification information exception"; 90
(3) the foreign intelligence and secret service protection function ex-
emption;9' and (4) the emergency access exemption. 92
was "absolutely necessary . . . [t]o detect money laundering schemes [and] prevent bank
fraud and other insider abuse . H.R. REP. No. 716, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988).
According to the Committee:
[T]he RFPA] was never meant to protect those insiders who violate their po-
sition of trust and who may also have an account at the institution in which
they serve. The Committee has had a strong history of examining insider
abuses. Under present law, the individual under investigation often has ac-
cess to vital bank records and can alter, destroy, or conceal them if notified
that some information has been transferred to a law enforcement agency,
usually by way of a criminal referral.
Id.
86 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i). This exception was enacted to eliminate dwindling grand jury
secrecy as a result of expanded customer notice provisions and challenge rights of the
RFPA. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 246, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273,
9376.
87 12 U.S.C. § 3420(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
88 Id. § 3409(a). These RFPA provisions cover individuals and partnerships of five or
less partners. Id. § 3401(4).
89 Id. § 3413(e). The Act does not apply when financial records are sought through
the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedures, or through other rules in connection
with any judicial proceeding to which the Government authority and the customer are a
party. Id.
90 Id. § 3 413(g). This section provides that the Act does not require customer notice
and a challenge opportunity, nor does it impose restriction of interagency transfers, where
only basic account identification information is involved, such as the name and address of
the customer, the type of account, and the account number. Id. More specific inquiries as
to the account number associated with a particular financial transaction or class of transac-
tion, as well as an account associated with a foreign country or subdivision thereof, are
also permitted. Id.
91 Id. § 3414(a). This section permits authorized foreign intelligence investigations
and functions as a secret service in protecting the president and certain other federal offi-
cials and candidates to be conducted without compliance with the Act. Id. A certificate of
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As is evident, the position of the United States regarding the
extent of an individual's right of privacy and access to customer
records in the hands of financial institutions is diametrically opposed
to the view of secrecy jurisdictions. Historically, these divergent
views with respect to customer records have caused serious conflicts.
B. History of Clashes Between the United States and Foreign
Sovereigns Based Upon Conflicting Views of Privacy
From the 1960s to approximately 1976, the United States was
deferential to other jurisdictions' secrecy laws,93 based on notions of
sovereignty and comity. 94 Since 1976, however, the trend has been
away from such deference. 95 Following that period, however, the
United States has had a long history of controversies with bank se-
crecy jurisdictions particularly in investigations and pre-trial pro-
ceedings in the United States which seek to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction in order to obtain discovery of information located
abroad. 96 Friction between jurisdictions usually occurs when the
compliance, signed by a supervisory official of a rank designated by the head of the gov-
ernment authority seeking access, will be submitted to the financial institution and those
receiving such certificates are prohibited by the Act from revealing to the customer that
access to financial records was sought or has been obtained. Id. Those provisions of no-
tice are enforceable by court order under 12 U.S.C. § 3418. Id. § 3418.
92 Id. § 3414(b). This section permits government access to financial records in lim-
ited emergency situations where any delay would create imminent danger of physical in-
jury, serious property damage, or flight from prosecution. Id. Here, too, a certification of
compliance must be executed and delivered to the financial institution, and the govern-
ment must file in court within five days thereafter a sworn statement by the supervisory
official justifying use of the emergency exemption, and unless a delay order is sought and
obtained, must then notify the customer as soon as practicable that his/her records were
obtained. Id.
93 See infra notes 94, 110-116 and accompanying text (describing case law during the
1960s and 1970s as demonstrating immense deference to foreign secrecy laws).
94 The Supreme Court clearly articulated the notion of "sovereignty" in the decision
of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). Writing for
the court, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not im-
posed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would
imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction." Id. at 136. More
than eighty years later the court defined "comity":
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to the inter-
national duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
95 See generally Newcomb, supra note 56, at 66-67 (discussing erosion of deference to
foreign bank secrecy laws). See also infra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (discussing
cases requiring production of documents under U.S. law in complete disregard for foreign
secrecy laws).
96 The quarrels have been varied and typified primarily in the area of antitrust litiga-
tion, particularly shipping industry litigation, uranium cartel litigation and SEC investiga-
tions and most recently in money laundering/narcotics investigations. See generally James
D. Harmon, Jr., United States Money Laundering Laws: International Implications, 9 N.Y.L. ScH.
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United States uses procedural techniques to obtain information
abroad which, based on United States laws, should be readily avail-
able to the government but which the foreign concern cannot pro-
vide because of its secrecy laws. For example, the United States has
used devices known as "compelled waivers" 97 which ignore both in-
ternational comity and the policy bases for financial confidentiality
principles, to obtain evidence extraterritorially in derogation of se-
crecy protections. Similarly in disregard of foreign laws, foreign
banks have been made to provide access to information even when
the divulging of that information violates the secrecy laws of another
nation. 98 Notwithstanding secrecy laws, persons who fail to provide
information will be found in contempt of court. 99
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 29 (1988) (discussing procedural implications on U.S. law caused by
foreign nondisclosure law).
97 A compelled waiver, more commonly known as a consent directive, is a written
form which sets forth an individual's consent to the disclosure of her/his foreign bank
records. In short, the individual executes a written directive to the foreign bank to divulge
information about her/his account to the Department ofJustice. The individual's authori-
zation is given under "compelled consent" because if the individual refuses to sign the
directive, she/he can be held in contempt.
98 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988). In this case, the release of bank
account information would have violated the laws of the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. In
the Cayman Islands, a bank commits a crime if it releases confidential information con-
cerning a customer's account in the absence of customer consent. Id. at 203 n.l. Simi-
larly, in Bermuda, the common law provides an implied contract of confidentiality between
the banks and its customer except where it is ordered to do so by a Bermuda court or it is
given specific written consent by its customer. Id. Doe arose from an investigation of peti-
tioner Doe's suspected fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported
income. He was ordered to produce records of transactions involving accounts at three
banks in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Id. at 202. When Doe was later subpoenaed to
appear before a grand jury he invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation when questioned on the existence or location of other records. Id. at 203. The U.S.
branches of the three foreign banks were then served with subpoenas ordering the release
of documents relating to accounts over which Doe has signatory authority. Id. Citing bank
secrecy laws of the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, the banks refused production. Id. The
government then filed a motion in the Southern District of Texas for an order requiring
that the court compel Doe to sign twelve consent forms authorizing the release of informa-
tion pertaining to twelve bank accounts. Id. The trial court judge denied the motion, but
was reversed by the Fifth Circuit on the grounds that because the consent directive "did
not have testimonial significance" the compelled execution did not violate Doe's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 205. Accordingly, on remand, the
trial judge ordered Doe to sign the release, he refused and was held in contempt and was
imprisoned. Id. at 205-06. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, held "such a directive as is at issue here does not implicate the [Fifth]
Amendment" as it is not testimonial in nature." Id. at 206. See generally Newcomb, Waiving
Bank Secrecy in the U.S., INT'L. FIN. L. REv. 22 (1988) (for an in depth review of the Doe case);
see also Bruce Zagaris, Dollar Diplomacy: International Enforcement of Money Movement and Re-
lated Matters. A United States Perspective, 22 GEo. WASH. J. INr'L L. & ECON. 465, 539-542
(1989) [hereinafter Zagaris] (analyzing Doe and development of consent directives).
99 Recently, in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Union Bank of Switzerland v. United
States of America, 60 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. 1992), the Supreme Court upheld a trial court's
contempt ruling based on the bank's failure to produce records to a United States grand
jury in Miami of its wholly-owned Panamanian subsidiary. The lower court had imposed
sanctions of $10,000 per day. The trial court expressly said that the "one impediment to
compliance," violation of Panamanian law, was insufficient to excuse compliance.
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Foreign jurisdictions have reacted to the United States' disre-
gard of their secrecy laws by enacting blocking statutes' 00 - statutes
passed specifically to prohibit disclosure of information to United
States authorities. These statutes, unlike the bank secrecy statutes
which protect the individual's privacy, protect the sovereignty of the
enacting state.'10 Typically, the blocking statutes ensure that offen-
sive foreign disclosure orders (e.g., United States orders to produce),
are not honored by prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspection or
removal of documents located in the territory of the enacting
state.' 0 2 As of 1986, approximately fifteen states adopted legislation
expressly designed to counter the United States' efforts to secure
production of documents situated outside of the United States.10 3
The foreign perspective in enacting the blocking statutes is that,
based on notions of sovereignty and comity, whatever pre-trial or
investigative procedures the United States may adopt for itself may
be applied to persons or documents outside the United States only
with the permission of that foreign state. 10 4 However, the United
States' perspective, even in light of the sovereign blocking statutes
and international comity principles, is that persons who do business
in the United States, or otherwise bring themselves within the United
States' jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate, are subject both to
the burdens and benefits of the United States laws.' 0 5 Routinely, the
dispute involves the United States' statutory grant of governmental
access to customer records i n the custody of financial institutions. A
brief review of some of the most notorious incidents is instructive.
From the 1940s through the 1970s, blocking statutes evidenced
foreign sovereigns' disapproval of United States investigatory tactics.
In 1947, Ontario enacted a blocking statute in response to the order
of a federal court in New York that directed a Canadian subsidiary of
a New York corporation to produce documents in Canada for use by
a New York grand jury that was investigating Sherman Act viola-
100 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442
n.4 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The Restatement is merely the opinion of
the American Law Institute (ALl), and is "in no sense an official document of the United
States." Id. at IX. Section 442 of the Restatement defines blocking statutes as ones which
"... are designed to take advantage of the foreign government compulsion defense... by
prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspection, or removal of documents located in the
territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities." Id. § 442,
n.4.
101 Id.
102 See generally Newcomb, supra note 56, at 61 (discussing the rise of blocking statutes
as foreign reaction to United States extraterritorial investigatory measures).
103 SEC Requests for Comments on Waiver by Conduct, 16 BNA's SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1305,
1307 (1984).
104 Id.
105 See Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). One who purposefully avails
her/himself of conducting activities within ajurisdiction is subject to the burdens and ben-
efits of that forum's laws. Id.
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tions. 10 6 In the 1950s, various blocking statutes were passed to pro-
hibit the removal of documents from foreign jurisdictions when
United States federal courts issued orders for the production of doc-
uments in relation to the United States Department ofJustice investi-
gation of an alleged petroleum cartel.' 0 7 In the next decade, statutes
were enacted by foreign sovereigns when the United States Maritime
Commission sought to obtain information from shipping lines oper-
ating to and from the United States concerning alleged anti-competi-
tive and discriminatory practices of international shipping
conferences.' 0 8 In the 1970s, the Department ofJustice's attempt to
secure information regarding a worldwide uranium producers' cartel
resulted in other blocking statutes.' 0 9
Even though United States courts initially showed some defer-
ence to foreign sovereigns' interests, early confrontations were indi-
cations that the differing philosophies eventually would cause
problems. For example, in one case from 1960, the Second Circuit
refused to enforce a subpoena directed to the New York agencies of
two Canadian banks to produce records maintained in Canada based
upon "fundamental principles of international comity."1 0 By 1968,
however, the same court, in connection with a grand jury investiga-
106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, § 442 n.4; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian International Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013, 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1947) (finding that company had to produce records because it was under
United States jurisdiction).
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, § 442 n.4; see also In re Investigations of
World Arrangements With Relation to the Production, Transportation, Refining and Dis-
tribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1952) (ordering that documents
located in foreign countries must be made available for inspection).
108 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, § 442 n.4; see, e.g., Federal Maritime Ship-
ping Act of May 24, 1965, Art. 11, [1965] Bundesgesetzblatt pt. II 833, 835 (German
Blocking Statute), cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, § 442 n.4.
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, § 442 n.4; See also In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 1977) (led Canada to enact a
national blocking statute).
I 10 Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960). The Second Circuit's decision
in Ings was consistent with an even earlier case in which the court indirectly took a deferen-
tial position to foreign law. See First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960). In First National, the IRS served First National with
a summons in order to obtain customer records in its Panamanian branch. Id. at 618. The
main issue in the case was whether these customer records located in Panama were within
control of the bank. While the court found the records to be within the bank's control, it
warned that if the production of the records would violate Panamanian law, production
would not be ordered. Id. at 619; see also Newcomb, supra note 56, at 65-66 (outlining the
initial deference of American courts involving cases where information was sought outside
the United States from non-party witnesses).
After the First National decision, in 1962, Chase Manhattan Bank was served with a
grand jury subpoena ordering the production of bank records "wherever held." In re
Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962). After the summons was served,
Panama enacted a nondisclosure statute making it a misdemeanor to produce documents
for use in litigation abroad. Id. at 612. In accordance with its decision in First National, the
court concluded that it could not compel production based "[ulpon fundamental princi-
ples of international comity." Id. (quoting Ings, 282 F.2d at 152).
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tion of a quinine cartel, upheld a subpoena issued to a New York
bank to produce documents relating to transactions of its customers
in New York and in Germany."Il The refusal by the New York bank
to produce the documents located abroad resulted in a contempt or-
der 1 2 in which the court ruled that the importance of enforcing the
antitrust laws of the United States was greater than Germany's bank
secrecy doctrine."l 3 In the 1980s, various federal courts found that
the United States' interest trumped foreign sovereigns' interests in
confidentiality. For example, one court found that the United States'
interest in collecting taxes outweighed Switzerland's interest in pre-
serving business secrets of Swiss subsidiaries of American corpora-
tions;" 14 another held that the United States' interest in upholding
the grand jury powers to investigate crime outweighs the interests of
the foreign bank secrecy laws; 1 5 and a third court held that foreign
laws are not dispositive of whether discovery is allowable.' 16
In these cases, United States courts imposed sanctions for non-
compliance with production orders notwithstanding the existence of
foreign secrecy laws or blocking statutes." t 7 Indeed, the United
States courts have imposed sanctions even when the non-compliance
for the United States court order is based upon a foreign states court
order not to produce."18 Not unexpectedly, such an approach by the
III United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 905 (2d Cir. 1968).
112 Id. at 898.
113 Id. at 905. In balancing the respective national interests of the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany, the court turned to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES which provides that jurisdiction will be exercised in
light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states; (b) the extent and nature of
the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the
person; (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state; (d) the nationality of the person; and (e) the ex-
tent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be ex-
pected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) has been revised since its application in the First National
court. In 1987, the ALI published the RESTATEMENT (THIRD). RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 100. In section 403 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) the ALI incorporated and
expanded upon the factors set forth in section 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100,
§ 403. For a more detailed explanation of the newly revised balancing test of the Restate-
ment, see infra note 119.
114 United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1098 (1981).
115 United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
116 See SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Swiss cor-
poration traded on inside information on the Philadelphia stock exchange).
117 See, e.g., In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983) (subsidiary diverted taxable income to Swiss parent to circumvent U.S. income tax
laws).
I'8 Id.
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United States generated much ill will from other sovereigns.
United States courts, in an effort to appear to resolve these juris-
dictional clashes more fairly, have turned to the Restatement's pro-
posed test: balancing the interest of the two sovereigns. 1 9 Courts
will consider such factors as the nexus of the activity investigated to
the territory of the regulating state; the connection(s) between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activ-
ity; the character or nature of the regulated activity and its impor-
tance to the regulating state; the expectations that are affected by the
regulations; the importance of a regulation to international political,
legal or economic systems; the consistency of the regulations to the
international systems; the interest another jurisdiction may have in
regulating the activity; and the likelihood of conflict with another
state's regulations. 120
Prior to proceeding to the discussion in Part IV concerning drug
trafficking and money laundering issues, it is useful to understand
how the United States' perspective of, and approach to,jurisdictional
clashes is imbued with a narrow cultural perspective. The United
States historically has established "indicia" of unacceptable conduct
that often does not, and can not, translate into a foreign sovereign's
legal structure. The use of "indicia" has continued and expanded
into the drug trafficking and money laundering investigations and is
an even greater dilemma in this area because of an apparent global
embracing of the indicia notion. Use of such indicia is troubling be-
cause, as has been evident in the United States' experience, it is re-
flective of narrow, insular presumptions rather than fact findings.
Moreover, use of indicia creates, rather than resolves, disputes -
disputes that could find resolution using an international, rather
than an insular, perspective. Two early non-drug examples are in-
structive. The Santa Fe case 121 provides a good example of how indi-
cia stand as apparently insurmountable roadblocks. The Santa Fe
case arose out of an SEC insider trading investigation that took place
after the Switzerland - United States Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
(MLAT) was signed, 12 2 but before the Swiss insider trading laws
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, § 403. Whether a state may prescribe law
when seeking documents located in a foreign jurisdiction depends on reasonableness. Id.
§ 403(1). To determine what is reasonable, the court should examine the balancing fac-
tors set forth in Section 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND). Id. § 403(2) (a)-(h); see also supra
note 113 (listing balancing factors of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)). Even if the exercise of
jurisdiction is unreasonable, "each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the
other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction . . ." Id. § 403(3).
120 Id. § 403(2).
121 S & C Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of, and Call Options for
the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Corporation, [1983-84] [Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
122 Treaty between the United States of American and The Swiss Confederation On
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302
(1977) [hereinafter U.S.-Swiss Treaty].
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were changed.' 23 Thus, at the time of the investigation, insider trad-
ing, while considered a dishonorable act, was not a crime in
Switzerland. 124
The problem arose because the MLAT contained a dual crimi-
nality provision. Thus, the Swiss court was limited to analyzing the
United States' request for information based on the two Swiss legal
provisions that could render the investigated conduct a crime: either
unfaithfulness to management or fraud. The activity investigated, as
presented in the SEC's request, did not meet the requirements of
either Swiss provision. The Swiss highest court concluded that use
of private information, while morally repugnant and dishonorable,
was not a crime. Consequently, Switzerland, although ready and
willing, was legally unable to provide the information.
The Swiss court, however, exhibited an unusual desire to coop-
erate. It gratuitously explained to the United States' investigators
that in Switzerland it would have been a crime to give away business
secrets - as opposed to individually using the information. In other
words, all the United States had to do, which it did in its second and
ultimately successful request for the same information, was to recog-
nize the Swiss perspective rather than try to push the United States
view: it simply needed to frame the request as seeking information
related to "giving away" rather than "using" business secrets.i 25
A second similar incident also involved Switzerland, but dealt
with tax fraud investigations. Swiss law prohibits production of doc-
uments in tax evasion investigations. Significantly, production is not
barred on secrecy grounds where the investigation is for tax fraud.
However, the definition of tax fraud under Swiss law does not in-
clude the filing of incomplete or incorrect statements on a return nor
does it include a false oral statement to an official. Consequently, for
a production request to be successful, it must be tailored not only in
terms of the indicia of tax fraud required in the United States, but it
must comport to the Swiss notion of tax fraud.i26
123 See, e.g., 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at 878 (June 10, 1988) (on Swiss insider
trading laws).
124 See e.g., Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means
For Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trad-
ing, Aug. 31, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) (acknowledging insider trading as a violation of
United States securities laws but not punishable under Swiss law). In Santa Fe, the United
States investigated irregular trading prior to the merger of the Santa Fe International Cor-
poration with the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation by reviewing accounts in foreign banks.
The SEC wanted the identity of purchasers whose accounts were in foreign banks and
requested that Switzerland, under the MLAT, provide the desired information. Santa Fe,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 99,424.
125 See Exchange Act Release No. 21, 186 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Report
(CCH) at 86, 982 83, 648 (July 30, 1984).
126 See Maurice Aubert, The Limits of Swiss Banking Secrecy Under Domestic and International
Law, 2 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAw 239, 280 (1984) (on Swiss policy regarding disclosure of tax
information).
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These examples reveal how understanding different jurisdic-
tions' perspectives on a particular activity can result in mutual coop-
eration without encountering or engaging in jurisdictional conflicts
that, indeed, might be unnecessary. Following such an approach
would have avoided the perception of the United States as ajurisdic-
tion that abused power and failed to respect notions of international
comity. Judicial decisions enforcing the extraterritorial federal
grand jury subpoenas including drug-related as well as non-drug re-
lated investigations have, not surprisingly, caused immense concern
to the foreign banks and international businesses. 127 The prosecu-
tors' arguments are insular, peremptory and simplistic: if you do
business in the United States, you accept any associated risk. This
perspective presumes that only the United States position is sound.
Following this point of view, prosecutors urge that the foreign se-
crecy laws simply stand in the way of law enforcement and, therefore,
should be ignored. This posture is not only narrow-minded, it vio-
lates notions of comity and international law. 128
Part IV below traces the development of the Bank Secrecy Act,
through which the United States broadened its access to information
in investigations of economic and other crimes. This Part particu-
larly focuses on drug trafficking and money laundering. Included is
a discussion of the indicia regularly used to identify proscribed con-
duct and verbal actions which result in unwarranted intrusions on
individuals' privacy - indicia which, because of the United States'
strength in the world of international finance and the genuine desire
127 As noted in note 99 supra, this was the problem in Union Bank of Switzerland.
However, the problem has existed for some time. In United States v. The Bank of Nova Scotia,
691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982), Canadian bank's offshore branches possessed records that
U.S. prosecutors needed as evidence. The Canadian bank had a branch in the U.S. and a
grand jury subpoena was issued to this branch. The branch itself was not involved in the
conduct that was the subject of the investigation. The U.S. branch, who was the subpoe-
naed witness, was only a custodian of records.
The bank secrecy laws of the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, the places where the
desired records were located, if violated, would subject the bank to serious civil and crimi-
nal penalties. The U.S. government investigators nevertheless demanded that the bank
fully comply with the subpoena. After balancing the equities the court determined that the
bank had in bad faith failed to comply with the subpoena and imposed a $25,000.00 per
day fine until there was compliance. The bank paid approximately $1,825,000.00 in fines
before producing the requested documents.
This approach, however, is not without dispute. In In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494
(D.C. Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia came to an opposite
conclusion. This court excused a U.S. branch of a worldwide bank from the demand of
federal grand jury to turn over customer records held in a foreign branch. The Court of
Appeals wrote that the contempt order issued by the District Court represented an inap-
propriate attempt by an American court to compel a foreign person (the bank) to violate
the laws of a different foreign sovereign on that sovereign's own territory. In order to
comply with the U.S. court order, the bank would be required to gather the documents in
its foreign branch, and smuggle them out of the foreign country in violation of that coun-
try's criminal law. In fact, the U.S. court would be ordering a criminal violation.
128 See Houlihan, A Dilemma Facing International Banks: Whether to Obey Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas of Foreign Bank Secrecy Laws (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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to eradicate nefarious drug-related conduct, have been embraced in-
ternationally to the detriment of individuals' privacy concerns.
IV. Bank Secrecy and Money Laundering - The United States'
Approach
The BSA was first enacted in 1970 as part of the fight against
white collar fraud and organized crime. 129 It was specifically
designed to frustrate the commission of white collar crime by limit-
ing the ability of criminals to conduct certain transactions secretly by
creating an easily traceable paper trail. Of particular concern to the
United States was that foreign bank accounts, especially those in ju-
risdictions with bank secrecy laws, were part of schemes to evade
taxes, violate securities laws, import illicit drugs and engage in other
types of illegal activity.' 30 Since its enactment, the BSA's reach has
broadened consistently, especially in 1986 when it became clear that
banks were not complying with the reporting requirements 13 1 and in
1988, with the enactment of Anti-Drug Abuse Act.' 32 In these ef-
129 See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4394, 4400. The primary purpose of the BSA is to identify the sources, volumes and move-
ments of money traveling into and out of the country and through domestic financial insti-
tutions. Id.
130 The House report provides:
Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have
permitted proliferation of 'white collar' crime; have served as the financial
underpinning of organized criminal operations in the United States; have
served as essential ingredients in frauds including schemes to defraud the
United States; have served as the ultimate depository of black market pro-
ceeds from Vietnam; have served as a source of questionable financing for
conglomerate and other corporate stock acquisitions, merger and takeovers;
have covered conspiracies to steal from U.S. defense and foreign aid funds;
and have served as the cleaning agent for 'hot' or illegally obtained monies.
H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4397.
131 In 1986, Congress enacted the MLCA of 1986 which amended the BSA. Subtitle
H of Title I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 100
Stat. 3207-18-39 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and
31 U.S.C.); see 132 CONG. REC. H6739 (Sept. 11, 1986) (passage in House); 132 CONG.
REC. S 14302 (Sept. 30, 1980) (passage in Senate); see also United States v. Busey, 876 F.2d
1297, 1306 n. 17 (... MLCA passed to eliminate inefficacy of Bank Records and Foreign
Transaction Act); see also H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986) (noting willful
violations of reporting requirements by financial institutions). For example, Congress
made it a criminal violation to structure currency transactions to avoid the reporting re-
quirements or to cause a false currency report transaction, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, and obli-
gated banks to report suspected structuring and other BSA violations to regulatory and
criminal law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3531 (1992); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11
(b)(5) (1992); Treasury Admin. Rul. 88-1, 53 Fed. Reg. 40063, 40064-66 (Oct. 18, 1988).
132 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); see S.2852, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S14115-91 (Oct. 21, 1988). The purpose of the revisions was "to
combat drug trafficking, organized and white collar crime, tax evasion and other crimes in
which criminals use the nation's financial institutions as a means to conceal or launder
funds." H.R. REP. No. 100-716, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (remarks of Rep. St. Germain,
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs). By enacting the 1988
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Congress further expanded the scope of the BSA by authorizing the
Treasury Department to impose special indemnification and record-keeping requirements
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forts, however, the United States has gone so far so as to virtually, if
not wholly, obliterate any right of privacy in favor of law
enforcement.
This part traces the evolution of the BSA and its amendments in
three sections. The first subsection traces the legislative initiatives to
the present. The next subsection focuses on key substantive provi-
sions of the BSA and the third concentrates on the United States
efforts to conclude bilateral treaties that, effectively, give United
States laws extraterritorial effect.
A. BSA - Legislative Initiatives
In order to aid government investigations, the BSA requires the
reporting of all domestic transactions involving currency or its
equivalent above certain amounts.13 3 In addition, currency or mone-
tary instruments taken into or out of the country which are above
certain amounts must be reported 3 4 as well as transactions above
certain amounts involving foreign bank accounts.
1 3 5
In 1984, the Commission on Organized Crime recommended
further legislative changes after studying the problems of drug traf-
ficking and money laundering. 136 The Commission's 1984 report re-
vealed that the practice of money laundering had grown in the
United States and that it had become pervasive. The report exposed
the nexus between organized crime and money laundering 13 7 and
found that money laundering depended upon the transfer of funds
to foreign bank accounts, often to accounts in countries with strict
in connection with the sale of bank and other similar checks or money orders. See 31
U.S.C. § 5325. Specifically, a financial institution cannot issue or sell certain monetary
instruments, bank checks, cashier's checks, traveler's checks, or money orders for $3,000
or more in U.S. Currency unless:
(1) the individual has an account with such financial institution and the fi-
nancial institution:
(A) verifies that fact through a signature card or other informa-
tion maintained by such institution in connection with the account of
such individual; and
(B) records the method of verification according to a method
which the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe; or
(2) the individual furnishes the financial institution with such forms of iden-
tification as the Secretary of the Treasury may require and the financial insti-
tution verifies and records such information in accordance with regulations
which such Secretary shall prescribe.
Id. § 3325(a).
133 31 U.S.C. § 5315.
134 Id. § 5316.
135 Id. § 5313.
136 See President's Commission on Organized Crime, Organized Crime and Money
Laundering (1984) (Record Of Hearing II, March 14, 1984). This Commission was estab-
lished by the President in 1983, which, among other things, was responsible for suggesting
legislative changes to fight organized crime. See S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1986). The purpose of the first hearing was not to focus on a specific matter, but to set
the agenda for future hearings.
137 See The Cash Connection, supra note 2.
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secrecy laws, which funds would then be retransferred to the United
States in the form of a loan or a payment.' 38 Finally, the report
made clear that BSA enforcement was unsuccessful largely because
some of the largest banks in the country had not complied with its
reporting requirements. ' 39
Stepped up enforcement efforts followed the Commission's re-
port. By August 19, 1986, civil money penalties were assessed
against nineteen major banking institutions and one hundred and
seventy-seven criminal investigations were in progress.' 40 Congress
enacted the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA) as part
of the comprehensive 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which amended
the Bank Secrecy Act and strengthened it by enhancing reporting
and record-keeping requirements, rendering evasions of its provi-
sions more difficult and increasing penalties for any violations.' 4'
The expanded reporting and record-keeping requirements ad-
dress the notion of structured transactions 142 and require financial
institutions to report to the Internal Revenue Service any suspicion
of customers "structuring" transactions in such a fashion so as to
avoid BSA reporting requirements.143 "Willful blindness" knowl-
edge standards apply to structuring.' 44 Thus, financial institutions
must develop a system designed to assure compliance with record-
138 Id.
139 H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986).
140 Id.
141 Subtitle H of Title I of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§§ 1351-1367, 100 Stat. 3207-8-39 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); see 132 CONG. REC. H6739 (Sept. 11, 1986) (passage in
House); 132 CONG. REC. S14302 (Sept. 30, 1980) (passage in Senate). The U.S. House of
Representatives' report on the MLCA shows that the statutes were intended to be far
reaching. It provides that "a person who engages in a financial transaction using the pro-
ceeds of the designated offense would violate the section if such person knew that the
subject of the transaction were the proceeds of any crime." Id.
142 Prior to the 1986 amendments to the Act, federal courts were divided on whether
structuring transactions to prevent a financial institution from reporting the transactions
constituted a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. See, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 766
F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985) (reporting requirements were not violated when individual
purchased a series of checks over a one month period, exceeding $10,000); United States
v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (lth Cir. 1983) (imposed liability on individuals for
preventing financial institutions from filing reporting requirements by structuring transac-
tions); see generally, Plombeck supra note 7, at 84-85 (discussing the prohibition of evasive
structuring).
The Money Laundering Act of 1986 amended the Bank Secrecy Act by imposing lia-
bility on a person who causes or attempts to cause a financial institution from filing a
report or causes the report to contain false information. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(1) & (2). The
Bank Secrecy Act was further amended by making it a violation to structure, assist in struc-
turing, attempt to structure or attempt to assist in structuring a transaction to evade re-
porting requirements, regardless of whether such transaction is in fact reportable under
the Bank Secrecy Act. Id. § 5324(3).
143 Department of the Treasury, Bank Secrecy Act Administrative Ruling 88-1 (June
22, 1988).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976).
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keeping and reporting requirements that perhaps reaches beyond
the strict letter of the legislation. 145 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988146 added further record-keeping requirements relating to
purchases of money orders, travelers checks, bank checks and cashier
checks. Failure to comply with the requirements of the Act subjects
the institution to civil fines based on a willful or a gross negligence
standard.14 7
The BSA's reporting requirements not only impose an adminis-
trative burden on financial institutions, 148 but also are very costly. In
1989, the cost of such reporting was $129 million.' 49 But, from a
government enforcement perspective, these stricter regulations are
successful largely because the enhanced enforcement stepped up re-
porting. For example, in 1986, a total of 3.7 million reports were
filed; for 1989, that figure was 6.5 million reports, and in the first six
months of 1990, 4.2 million reports were filed.150
These statutory reporting requirements inevitably, and indispu-
tably, erode an individual's financial privacy. Pursuant to the statu-
tory construct, financial institutions are obligated to provide the
government information about their customers that plainly reveals
such persons' "religion, ideology, opinion and interest."'' l The
evasion of privacy rights effected by these reporting requirements is
exacerbated by the adoption of "Know Your Customer" require-
ments. 152 The erosion of privacy is directly proportional to the re-
145 31 U.S.C. § 1359.
146 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); see S.2852, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S14115-91 (Oct. 3, 1988); H.R. REP. No. 5210, 100th Cong. 2d
Sess. 134 CONG. REC. HI 1108-71 (Oct. 21, 1988). For example, financial institutions are
prohibited from issuing instruments in the amounts of $3,000 or more unless the individ-
ual has an account in the institution or the individual gives the institution identification
accepted by the secretary of the treasury.
147 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).
148 Domestic financial institutions are required to file currency transactions reports
("CTR") of each deposit, withdrawal, exchange, etc., involving a transaction in currency or
other monetary instrument of more than $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5313. Multiple same day
transactions also must be reported if these total more than $10,000. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)
(1991). This provision includes multiple transactions by one individual made to different
accounts, including transactions made by several people to one account on the same day if
they total more than $10,000. Reports also must be filed on the physical transportation of
currency and monetary instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000. 31 U.S.C.
§ 5316(a). Receipt of currency or monetary instruments in excess of $5,000 not otherwise
reported also must be reported if physical transportation of such sums is involved. Id.
Persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and having a financial
interest in a bank, securities or other accounts in a foreign country must report that rela-
tionship to the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 5314.
149 Tom Leander, The War On Laundering, AMERICAN BANKER, June 12, 1990, at 4.
150 Louis Gerhardstein, Reporting of Large Cash Transactions to IRS Surges Sharply, AMERI-
CAN BANKER, August 27, 1990, at 8.
151 California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas,J., dissenting).
152 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System expects financial institu-
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porting requirements: the greater the scope of the reporting
requirements, the greater the erosion of privacy. 153
Efforts to enhance regulations continue - efforts that, if
adopted, will further dismantle what little privacy rights remain. On
October 31, 1989, the Treasury Department published an advanced
notice of proposed rule-making on international fund transfers,
which set forth a number of regulatory options, including requiring a
report or record of all international wire transfers; requiring finan-
cial institutions to apply model "Know Your Customer" policies for
foreign originating international payments; and requiring reports of
suspicious international wire transfers. 154 A year later, in October
tions to incorporate the following "know your customer" policy into their business
policies:
I. Financial institutions should make a reasonable effort to determine the
true identity of all customers requesting the bank's services.
2. Financial institutions should take particular care to identify the owner-
ship of all accounts and of those using safe-custody facilities.
3. Identification should be obtained from all new customers.
4. Evidence of identity should be obtained from customers seeking to con-
duct significant business transactions.
5. Financial institutions should be aware of any unusual transaction activity
or activity that is disproportionate to the customer's known business.
With respect to personal accounts, Banks adhere to the following principles:
No account should be opened without satisfactory identification, such as:
- a passport or registration card
- a driver's license with a photograph issued by the State in which the
bank is located
Together with consideration of the customer's residence or place of busi-
ness. If it is not in the territory served by the bank questions should be
raised as to why the customer is opening an account at that location.
Consider the source of funds used to open the account. Large cash deposits
should be questioned.
For large accounts, ask the customer for prior bank reference and write a
letter to the bank asking about the customer.
When business accounts are opened, Banks should use the following practice:
Business principals should provide evidence of legal status (e.g., sole propri-
etorship partnership, or incorporation or association) when opening a busi-
ness account.
Check the name of a commercial enterprise with a reporting agency, or check
prior bank references.
For large commercial accounts, obtaining the following information is
suggested:
- A financial statement of the business
- A description of the customer's principal line of business
- A list of major suppliers and customers and their geographic locations
- A description of the business's primary trade area, and whether interna-
tional transactions are expected to be routine
- A description of the business operations, i.e., retail versus wholesale,
and the anticipated volume of cash sales.
While the size of financial institutions may vary, it is incumbent upon all insti-
tutions to adopt and follow policies and procedures appropriate to their size,
location, and type of business.
153 Significantly, the reporting requirements co-exist with the RFPA's feigned privacy
protection: a protection that the financial institution voluntarily give the government pri-
vate financial information and the government prevent notification to the customer that
any request for information has been made.
154 See 54 Fed. Reg. 45, 769 (1989); see also Amy G. Rudnick &Julie A. Stanton, Banks
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1990, the Treasury Department proposed to amend Bank Secrecy
Act regulations. These amendments would require banks and trans-
mitters and receivers of funds to maintain detailed records of domes-
tic and international fund transfers which would be retrievable by the
originator and beneficiary banks and non-bank financial
institutions. 155
Presently, regulations do not specify what information must be
contained in the records. Therefore, the information now kept var-
ies between or among institutions, making it difficult for law enforce-
ment to track money and for banks to retrieve information. 156 The
proposed rule, on the other hand, would require the originator's
bank to obtain the following information prior to initiating fund
transfers: the originator's name and account number; the identity of
the originator as a publicly traded corporation, government agency
or public utility company; the identity of the person on whose behalf
the fund transfer was originated; the amount of the fund transfer; the
execution date; the payment instructions; the beneficiary's bank; and
the beneficiary's name and account number.' 57 If non-account hold-
ers initiate fund transfers, the originator's bank also would be re-
quired to verify the originator's name and address, and record his or
her name, address, social security number, and date of birth. 58
The two most controversial aspects of the proposal pertain to
the request for "on whose behalf" the transaction is being con-
ducted and the requirement that the beneficiary banks obtain miss-
ing information from their customer.' 59 These requirements
certainly increase the onus on financial institutions to delve into their
clients' "business" or alternatively, to risk direct responsibility. In
all events, the extensive information financial institutions must keep
and make available to the government further erode the clients' pri-
vacy rights and increase the institution's compliance costs. 160
Are Concerned Over Treasury's Wire Transfer Proposal, 10 BANKING EXPANSION REP. 1 (1991)
[hereinafter Rudnick & Stanton].
155 See 55 Fed. Reg. 41,696, 41,699 (1990). The only information currently required
for wire transfers is a record of each advice, instruction or request for international fund
transfers of over $10,000.00. 31 C.F.R. § 103.25.
156 See 55 Fed. Reg. at 41,699. See also Rudnick & Stanton, supra note 154, at 13.
157 55 Fed. Reg. at 41,699.
158 Id.
159 Rudnick & Stanton, supra note 154, at 15.
160 Cost figures for implementing the new regulations vary, but based on a sur-
vey of 66 banks, the Bankers Association for Foreign Trade, concluded that
the proposed wire transfer amendments would impose over $160 million and
start up in first year in implementation expenses on the 300 largest banks.
Treasury's estimate is of 7.8 million person hours per year to implement the
regulations. The Bank Administration Institute concluded that it would cost
banks approximately $131 million each year for human power compliance,
and an additional $70 million for computer equipment, materials and train-
ing. The largest banks themselves estimated that it would cost between $14
million and $20 million in the first year to comply with the regulations. One
medium-sized bank estimated that it would cost $7 million to implement, and
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More recently, in June 1990, the House of Representatives
unanimously passed H.R. 26, the Money Laundering Enforcement
Amendments of 1991 - so-called "death penalty" legislation. 16 1
These amendments require federal regulators to hold hearings to
consider revoking any federal charter and/or insurance whenever
the bank and two or more of its officers, directors or senior executive
officers are convicted of a BSA or an MLCA offense. 16 2 These new
regulations are an additional burden on financial institutions particu-
larly because of the broad scope of criminal corporate liability,16 3 the
money laundering statutes incorporation of the willful blindness
standard of knowledge, 164 and the notions of collective knowl-
edge.' 65 The Senate version of the bill' 66 allows regulators to re-
voke a charter regardless of whether any of the institution's officers
or directors are convicted. The bill, approved by the Senate Banking
Committee, 16 7 specifies factors for regulators to consider in exercis-
ing discretion which somewhat differ from the House bill. 168
a smaller bank estimated that it would cost $55,000.00 initially and
$106,300.00 annually.
Rudnick & Stanton, supranote 154, at 14.
161 H.R. 26, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). H.R. 26 requires that regulators consider
four factors in exercising discretion:
1) The extent to which senior management was involved in the offense;
2) The extent to which the offense occurred despite the fact that an institu-
tion's policies and procedures to prevent money laundering were in
existence;
3) The extent of the institution's cooperation with law enforcement offi-
cials; and
4) Whether the institution has taken steps to prevent similar money laun-
dering offenses in the future.
These amendments were originally introduced in response to the plea bargain of the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") money laundering case. Id.
162 The first version mandated charter revocation for financial institutions convicted of
money laundering, but the bill was modified so that the final bill afforded regulators' dis-
cretion to impose administrative sanctions, including charter revocation under specified
circumstances. See generally Byrne, Overview of 1991 Money Laundering Legislation, 1991
Money Laundering Enforcement Update: Compliance and Enforcement Issues Course
Materials I [hereinafter Byrne].
163 See New York Cent. and Hudson River RR Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481
(1909); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1125 (1973).
164 See United States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
165 United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 943 (1987). See generally Adams, Effective Strategies for Banks Faced with Potential
Criminal and Civil Liability in Money Laundering Cases, 1991 Money Laundering En-
forcement Update: Compliance and Enforcement Issues Course Materials 330, 336 [here-
inafter Adams].
166 S.543, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S17910-01 (Nov. 23, 1991).
167 See Byrne, supra note 162, at 1.
168 S. 543. The Senate requires regulators to consider:
1) The degree to which senior management officials knew of, or were in-
volved in, the money laundering operations;
2) Whether the local community's interest in depository and credit services
would be threatened by forfeiture of the institution's charter or insurance;
3) Whether the institution fully cooperated with law enforcement
authorities;
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Other congressional action may be forthcoming in the area of
money laundering. In August of 1991, Senator D'Amato introduced
the Money Laundering Improvements Act of 199 1.169 Among other
things, this proposed Act enhances the forfeiture provisions. 170
B. Key Substantive Provisions of the Anti-Drug Trafficking and
Money Laundering Laws
The Anti-Drug Abuse law was crafted to reach far beyond nar-
cotics traffickers and traditional notions of money laundering. 17'
The basic premise is that all persons who do business with a drug
trafficker, or any other criminal, do so at some substantial risk if,
knowing that they are being paid with the proceeds of crime, use that
money in a financial transaction. For example, the money launder-
ing provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, collectively called the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MCLA), criminalized the
deposit and receipt of criminally derived funds even if for legitimate
purposes. 172 In addition, forfeiture provisions permit the govern-
ment to seize "traceable proceeds" of any illegal activity. 173 The
broad sweep of the laws exacerbates the erosion of privacy concerns.
Section 1956 of the MCLA makes it a criminal offense to engage
in domestic or international financial transactions involving crimi-
nally-derived funds with knowledge that the proceeds represent a
form of unlawful activity with the intent to promote unlawful activity
or with knowledge that the transaction is designed to conceal or dis-
guise the ownership, source or control of the funds or to avoid re-
porting requirements. 174 This section applies to transactions in fact
4) Whether there will be any losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance Funds
or the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"); and
5) Whether the institution at the time of the conviction (a) had a deterrence
and compliance program that exceeded federal requirements; (b) adequately
monitored officers, agents and employees to insure compliance; and (c)
promptly reported suspected violations to law enforcement authorities.
S.543, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S17910-01 (Nov. 23, 1991).
Finally, the. Senate version gives Treasury new authority to create "know your cus-
tomer" requirements similar to the G-7 Task Force recommendation. See infra notes 341-
362 and accompanying text (on G-7 Task Force).
169 S.1665, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S12236-43 (Aug. 2, 1991). The
act contains three titles. Title I sets forth new procedures that extend the ability of the
Department of Justice to use civil forfeiture statutes in money laundering cases. Title 2
amends the provisions of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. Title 3 amends the
BSA and RFPA by way of adopting provisions prepared by the Department of the Treas-
ury. Section 301(b), conforms the United States' enforcement with the recommendations
of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Id.
170 Id.
171 The MLCA is broader than the BSA because it outlaws a wide range of financial
transactions beyond those covered by the BSA which involve the physical transfer of
currency.
172 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
173 18 U.S.C. § 981 (civil forfeiture section); 18 U.S.C. § 982 (criminal forfeiture sec-
tion); see also Plombeck, supra note 7, at 81-82 (discussing forfeiture provisions).
174 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Section 1956(a)(1) provides that the defendant must
266 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. [VOL. 18
derived from specified unlawful activity (most federal white-collar of-
fenses as well as drug offenses),' 175 or any funds which the federal law
enforcement agents represent to be so derived. 176 Notably, the sec-
tion creates extraterritorial jurisdiction when monetary instruments
are transported if the proscribed conduct is carried out by a United
States citizen or if the activity occurs in part in the United States. 77
"know" that the proceeds are derived from "some form of unlawful activity," and, in addi-
tion, must either:
(A) [I]nten[d] to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(B) know[] that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Fed-
eral law.
Id.
Under the first prong of section 1956(c) the defendant need know only that the pro-
ceeds derive from "some form of unlawful activity." Id. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1),
the term 'knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction repre-
sents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity' means that the person
knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from
some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a
felony under State or Federal law, regardless of whether or not such activity
is 'specified unlawful activity,' within the meaning of section of 1956(c)(7).
In addition to "knowing" that the proceeds represent "some form of unlawful activ-
ity," the defendant must fall within the second prong of section 1956(a)(2). Specifically,
the defendant must have conducted the prohibited acts "with the intent to promote the
carrying on of specified unlawful activity" or with the knowledge that the transaction is
designed "to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity" or "to avoid a transaction reporting
requirement under State or Federal law." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(l)(A)(i), (B)(i)-(ii).
Originally, the Senate proposed an "intent to facilitate" standard as opposed to the
"intent to promote" standard adopted by the Act. "Intent to promote" is a higher stan-
dard. See Plombeck, supra note 7, at 72. The "knowing" language of the statute is a high
scienter standard. According to Congress, negligent involvement will not be punishable.
See S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 6, 8 (1986) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Report].
Congress also rejected a proposal by the Department of Justice that the knowledge re-
quirement include a "reckless disregard" standard. Id. at 10. However, "willful blind-
ness" is sufficient. Id. at 35; see also United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). For a general discussion of the scienter requirements of the
Money Laundering act see Plombeck, supra note 7, at 71-73.
175 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
176 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(C), (a)(2)(B) (Supp. II. 1990).
177 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2). Under § 1956(a)(2) it is a crime to:
transport[] or attempt[] to transport a monetary instrument or funds from a
place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States or
to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United
States-
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activ-
ity and knowing that such transportation is designed in whole or in
part -
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activ-
ity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Fed-
eral law ...
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Section 1957 of the MCLA, on the other hand, was designed to
permit prosecution of those who provide services to criminal ele-
ments and who knowingly accept criminal proceeds as payment, even
if they do not know what crimes were involved. 178 This section pro-
hibits knowingly engaging in virtually any financial transaction ex-
ceeding $10,000 when the defendant knows that the property is
criminally derived and the property is in fact derived from specified
unlawful activity. 179 Significantly, section 1957 does not require
knowledge that the money came from specified unlawful activity.'8 0
Rather, the requisite knowledge is that the property involved is de-
rived from crime.181 Under these circumstances, for example, a
banker who knows too much about his/her clients' business may fall
within the coverage of section 1957.182
Courts have broadly interpreted these MLCA provisions. For
example, courts have concluded that the government is not required
to trace the transaction's proceeds to'a specific predicate offense so
long as the available evidence gives rise to an inference that the
funds are derived from a specified unlawful activity.' 83 Similarly,
courts have read the scienter requirements liberally. The legislative
history shows that Congress intended to impose a "knowing" stan-
dard; Congress expressly rejected the government's efforts to im-
pose a "reason to know" or a "reckless disregard" standard. 8 4
Nevertheless, the legislative history also reflects Congress's intent to
apply the willful blindness standard. This gap has been used to allow
the government to avoid having to prove any direct knowledge of
The knowledge and intent requirements under § 1956(a)(2) are substantially similar
to those of § 1956(a)(1).
178 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c)
179 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). To show a violation of section 1957(a) one must establish
that (a) a monetary transaction occurred or was attempted which involved a financial insti-
tution and (b) involved criminally derived property in excess of $10,000.00 which (c) af-
fected interstate or foreign commerce and (d) which actually was derived from a specified
unlawful activity. Id. § 1957(0(1).
180 Id. § 1957(c).
181 Id. "Criminally derived property" is defined as "any property constituting, or de-
rived from proceeds obtained from a criminal offense." Id. § 1957(0(2).
182 See Mann, "A Lawyer's Guide to the 1986 Money Laundering Statute," I White-
Collar Crime Rep. 1, 6 (April 1987). Before the Money Laundering Act was amended, the
statute could be used to prosecute white-collar criminal defense lawyers who deposited
fees in excess of $10,000 received from their clients, assuming the lawyer knew that the
funds constituted "criminally derived property." Id. One way a lawyer might seek to avoid
potential liability would be to agree to a payment schedule of installments of less than
$10,000. Id. However, this option would sometimes present a problem under 18 U.S.C.
§ 5324(3) of the Bank Secrecy Act which imposes liability for "structuring transactions"
for the purposes of evading reporting requirements. In 1988, Congress amended section
1957 and eliminated attorney fees from the definition of "monetary transactions," thereby
preventing defense lawyers from being prosecuted for "knowingly . . . engag[ing] in a
monetary transaction in criminally derived property..." Id.
183 See United States v. Blackman, 897 F.2d 309, 316 (8th Cir 1990); United States v.
Mainieri, 694 F. Supp. 1394, 1396-97 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
184 See Senate Judiciary Report, supra note 174.
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wrongdoing. Rather, the government can satisfy the scienter re-
quirement by showing that a defendant willfully, consciously and/or
deliberately avoided knowledge of certain facts essential to prove a
criminal violation. 185
One of the most radical changes created by the MCLA is found
in the civil forfeiture provisions.186 These provisions provide for the
civil forfeiture of property that (a) represents proceeds of illegal nar-
cotic trafficking, and (b) facilitate or assist illegal narcotic traffick-
ing.' 8 7 Thus, the legislation allows the government to seize any
property that is "traceable proceeds" of any criminal activity.
The lawsuits pursuant to which seizures are made are in rem -
the government sues the property itself - and can be filed ex
parte.' 88 Venue is located in the district in which the asset is located.
The government's initial burden of proof is to establish probable
cause 189 that the seized asset was involved in a predicate crime, i.e.
was involved in, or is traceable to proceeds from, one of the drug
offenses. Although this is a question of law to be determined by the
district court, it is a rather subjective standard. In making the initial
determination concerning the freezing of assets, the court may con-
sider otherwise inadmissible hearsay or the testimony of a witness
that is not even identified at the hearing. Further, probable cause is
determined as of the time of the trial, not as of the time of the gov-
ernment's seizure. Therefore, evidence developed by the govern-
ment post-seizure can be introduced in support of its case.' 90
As with other provisions of the MLCA, courts have interpreted
the provisions that define the properties subject to forfeiture
broadly. For example, a district court interpreted the term "prop-
erty involved in" violations of the money laundering statutes to in-
clude all property that "facilitates" money laundering offenses. In
United States v. All Monies, the court found probable cause for the for-
feiture of an entire bank account, not just proceeds traceable to drug
trafficking, because the legitimate money in the account provided
cover for the tainted funds, thus "facilitating" money laundering.
The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the
185 Jewell, 532 F.2d at 699, n.3.
186 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)-(7).
187 Id.
188 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974) (on in
rem proceedings in a civil forfeiture action). In an in rem proceeding, the property is
deemed "... [Tihe offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the [property]
.... Id. at 684 (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14 (1827)).
189 Probable cause "is defined as a reasonable grounds for belief of guilt supported by
less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion." United States v. Route 2, Box
61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (W. D. Ark. 1990). It is noteworthy that probable cause is a
very low threshold requirement for the government to prove and, in essence, any set of
objective facts that supports a law enforcement agent's suspicion of a drug connection with
the property is likely to support a probable cause determination.
190 United States v. $41,305.00 in Currency, 802 F.2d 1339, 1342-45 (11 th Cir. 1986).
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account owner was neither a principal nor a conspirator in the un-
derlying criminal activities.' 9 '
Once the court finds probable cause, the burden shifts to the
civil claimant who wishes to challenge the seizure to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the probable cause findings
were flawed and that, indeed, the owner of the seized property is an
"innocent owner."' 192 Proving innocent ownership, however, is an
onerous burden. The "innocent owner" defense to the civil forfei-
ture provisions 9 3 requires proof by the claimant of one of two
things. First, a claimant may show that the property was not used for
an illegal purpose (i.e., was not linked to the commission of a predi-
cate crime). In the alternative, the claimant may show that even if
there is a nexus between the property and the proscribed act, s/he
had no knowledge of, or did not consent to, such use. 19 4
Under both civil and criminal forfeiture actions,' 95 the concept
of relation-back applies. Consequently, forfeiture becomes effective
as of the date of the criminality giving rise to the forfeiture rather
than as of the date of the seizure. The practical impact of the rela-
tion-back theory is that it permits the government to avoid transfers
of the forfeitable property to third parties, even if such transfers took
place after the underlying activity which gave rise to forfeiture
occurred. ' 96
The innocent owner provisions do not distinguish among claim-
ants even though claimants have different levels of attenuation with
respect to the frozen assets (the "traceable" funds), ranging from
institutional lenders to drug traffickers, to some removed third party
who simply is a participant in the international financial world and is
the accidental recipient of tainted funds. 19 7 Nevertheless, in inter-
preting the innocent owner provision, courts' 98 have extended to
the civil forfeiture theories the requirements set by the United States
Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company. 19 9
191 United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) In Account No. 90-3617-3, Israel Dis-
count Bank, 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991).
192 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)-(7) providing "... [N]o property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that person to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge or consent of that owner." Id. See generally, Dagen, Forfeiture and the Lending
Institution, 1991 Money Laundering Enforcement Update: Compliance and Enforcement
Issues Course Materials 230 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Dagen].
193 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2).
194 See Van Vliet, Forfeitures, 1991 Money Laundering Enforcement Update: Compli-
ance and Enforcement Issues Course Materials 181 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter
Van Vliet].
195 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(0, 982 (b)(I)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
196 Thus, the innocent owner defenses are an exception created by Congress to the
relation-back theory. See Van Vliet, supra note 194, at 185.
197 See generally Dagen, supra note 192, at 232.
198 United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11 h Cir. 1991)
199 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
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Thus, as under Calero, to prevail with an innocent owner defense a
claimant must establish: (1) that s/he was not involved in the illegal
activities; (2) that s/he was not aware of the wrongful activities; and
(3) that s/he did all s/he reasonably could to prevent the prescribed
use of his/her property.
Few decisions have interpreted the innocent owner standard.
One, United States of America v. One Single Family Residence Located at
15603 85th Avenue North, et al. ,200 crystallizes the claimants' dilemma
in establishing the innocent owner defense. In Single Family, the
court noted, essentially, that all entities connected with property
subject to forfeiture are wrongdoers. 20 1 If one is deemed to be a
wrongdoer, then any amount of the proceeds which could be tracea-
ble to the drug activities would render the entire property subject to
forfeiture. 20 2
Lenders who under the MLCA, like any other person whose
property is seized, may contest forfeiture of their interest in collat-
eral by proving their innocent ownership status, but are still in a diffi-
cult position.2 03  In United States v. Miraflores Ave.,204 Republic
National Bank, the mortgagee, failed to establish innocent ownership
and forfeited its $800,000.00 interest in a property based on the
bank's "blind indifference" to "suspicious circumstances" of the
mortgage loan transaction.20 5 It is noteworthy that the Court used
the following "facts" to reject the innocent owner defense: (1) the
corporate borrower and a stockholder were unknown to the bank
and the second guarantor on the note who was a long standing com-
mercial customer had no known connection with the borrower; (2)
the borrower was a Panamanian shell corporation which, according
to the Court, was a "preferred" vehicle for traffick or laundering that
had no known source of repayment or assets other than the collat-
eral; (3) the bank did not inquire into the purpose of the loan, con-
duct a title search, or assess the corporate shareholders financial
standing; (4) irrespective of the collateral's sufficiency to cover the
loan, the transaction was unusual in that it loaned two-thirds of the
appraised value, was structured as a one-year balloon note, did not
contain a repayment schedule or the borrower's undertaking to use
200 United States v. 15603 85th Ave. North, 933 F.2d 976, 981 (11 th Cir. 1991) (court
notes that "owner" should be broadly construed to include "any person" with a legal or
equitable interest in the seized property).
201 Id. See Dagen, supra note 192, at 236.
202 If, on the other hand, one is an innocent owner, no amount of the funds are forfeit-
able. However, someone who contributes legitimate funds with the knowledge that an-
other person was obtaining his/her share of the funds from narcotic trafficking is deemed
to satisfy the knowledge requirement. This person "knows" that his/her legitimate funds
are being co-mingled with drug proceeds. 15603 85th Ave., 933 F.2d at 981.
203 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6)-(7).
204 United States v. Miraflores Ave., 731 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1990), cert. granted,
112 S.Ct. 1159 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1992)
205 Id. at 1571. See Adams, supra note 165, at 357-58.
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the sale proceeds for repayment (the Court said that "banks are (not)
in the business of lending money with the intent to foresale of the
property"); (5) the bank quickly approved the transaction outside of
normal channels, and its President was intimately involved in the
process; (6) the second guarantor used part of the loan proceeds to
give a $3,000.00 honeymoon trip to the son of the bank's president;
and (7) most of the proceeds were transferred to the borrower's
Swiss bank account.20 6
In the Court's view, these "facts" showed Republic's "knowl-
edge". This conclusion wholly disregarded Republic's expert wit-
ness testimony that the "facts" were really only indicia of
wrongdoing as the circumstances described, and these facts, such as
the lender not personally knowing the corporate borrower or inquir-
ing into the purpose of the loan, were not commercially unusual in
South Florida. 207 Nevertheless, the government used the indicia to
craft its case and the court used the indicia as proven facts that sup-
ported its ruling. One is left to wonder what more the bank reason-
ably could have done to prevent the proscribed use of its
property.20 8
These cases show the "Catch-22" situation in which one seeking
to show innocent ownership finds him/herself. First, claimants have
to prove a negative - lack'of knowledge - a requirement seldom
seen in the law. Second, this endemically problematic position is ex-
acerbated by the indicia which create a presumption of guilt. In the
case of banks, it is virtually impossible to take care of negating every
indicia of wrongdoing that the government can raise after the fact, as
proof of wrongdoer status. For instance, financial transactions in-
volving various countries and/or their nationals appear to be pre-
sumptively suspect. Similarly individuals face the inability to show
that the indicia are not, and should not be, proof or presumptions of
wrongdoing.
Thus, as developed, the burden on the government appears to
be a much watered down version of the contemplated knowledge
standard that the legislature imposed. On the other hand, the bur-
den placed on the defense is virtually insurmountable. There clearly
206 Miraflores, 731 F. Supp. at 1572; Adams, supra note 165, at 358-59.
207 Miraflores, 731 F. Supp. at 1572; The court rejected this testimony but said that
such evidence, even if credited, is not determinative if the circumstances as a whole indi-
cate that the bank officer deliberately closed his eyes to facts giving every reason to believe
the collateral was criminally derived. Adams, supra note 165, at 359-60. Adams noted that
Miraflores teaches that the lending process must involve more than a simple credit risk
analysis. It must include due diligence to establish a good faith belief in the legitimacy of
the borrower and its funds, as well as the use of the collateral. The process must be docu-
mented, and the institution's officers and employees must be made aware of a strict policy
against transactions and proceeds derived from illegal activity and trained to spot "red
flags" of such transactions.
208 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
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exists a need for legislative balance of the legitimate needs of law
enforcement officers to receive information from a financial institu-
tion for legitimate investigative purposes with the need to protect
customers' right to privacy.
The expanded scope of the law aggravates the conflict. For ex-
ample, recent enactments mandate that institutions discover the
identity of persons having an account in the United States and the
identity of each individual who can make a withdrawal from that ac-
count.20 9 The information that must be obtained as part of record-
keeping and reporting requirements includes the taxpayer identifica-
tion of anyone who opens an account or purchases a certificate of
deposit.2 10 Moreover, these record-keeping requirements apply not
only to banks and thrifts but also to persons who, in the course of
business, issue and redeem checks, transfer funds, operate a cur-
rency exchange, operate a credit card system, and persons with simi-
lar or related functions.2 1
These regulations effectively make financial institutions central
to - indeed, quasi-enforcers in - the war against drugs. A bank
that takes security for a loan risks the loss of the security and a forfei-
ture action unless it can establish that it took sufficient steps to enti-
tle it to assert the innocent owner defense. 212 Individuals who use a
financial institution to conduct business effectively lose all privacy
rights and are subject to the same onerous innocent owner standard.
209 12 U.S.C. § 1829b.
210 31 C.F.R. § 103.34 (1991).
211 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6)-(7).
212 See generally Beiley, Safeguarding the Bank's Collateral, 1991 Money Laundering En-
forcement Update: Compliance and Enforcement Issues Course Materials 223 [hereinafter
Beiley].
Beiley explains that banks must take basic steps to insure that they know their cus-
tomer well enough to overcome a forfeiture attack in three contexts: First, in the initial
screening of the new customer; second, in periodic follow-ups; and third, in examining the
customer's banking transactions. Id.
Primary in the initial screening of customers, banks must obtain adequate identifica-
tion. For an individual customer, a bank should require one picture identification and a
well recognized non-picture identification. For corporate customers banks should require
a certificate of incorporation with all amendments, bylaws, properly executed corporate
resolutions and incumbency certificates. Id. Moreover, in opening new accounts for any
customer Beiley suggests that the information obtained include (1) addresses, past and
present residence and place of employment or business, (2) date of birth or of incorpora-
tion, and (3) telephone numbers.
In addition, Beiley lists the following factors that banks should consider as relevant in
evaluating the potential customer relationship: references; information on other banking
relationships; financial statements which would be prepared by an accountant and should
be requested in conneclion with significant transactions; and business activity. Id. at 224.
Beiley also suggests that banks keep a look out for customers who have accounts
and/or businesses in suspicious foreign jurisdictions. He claims that banks should beware
of persons who refuse to provide such information and suggests that such refusal should
be deemed as suspicious circumstances. Id. at 225.
In addition to the initial screening, banks should review existing accounts on an ongo-
ing basis and look for suspicious activity such as various types of local, national and inter-
national wire transfers. Id. at 225-26. In addition, monitoring account activity can help
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The catch is that nothing exists that creates any comfort or provides
any concrete guidance with respect to the sufficiency of the efforts
that are taken to avoid wrongdoing, particularly with the use of indi-
cia as incontrovertible proof of wrongdoing.
C. The International Reach of United States' Anti-Drug Enforcement
and Money Laundering Efforts
The Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988 made two significant changes
in United States law regarding its goal of strengthening international
cooperation to curb money laundering. 213 First, the Act orders the
Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate with the finance ministers of
foreign countries to establish an international currency control
agency that: (a) will serve as a central source of information; (b) will
collect and analyze cash transactions reports filed by members; and
(c) will encourage the adoption of uniform money laundering
acts. 214 Second, the Act directs the Secretary of the Treasury to
enter into negotiations with financial supervisory agencies of foreign
countries that set business in United States currency to reach agree-
ments that will ensure adequate record-keeping of large United
States currency transactions2 15 and that will establish a system to
make those records available to United States law enforcement
detect suspicious activities, such as check kiting, smurfing, and traditional associated
money laundering businesses. Id. at 226.
Certain activities related to the filing of CTR's can also present warning signals such
as (1) customer's reluctance to proceed with the transaction after being told that a CTR
must be filed, or reluctance to provide the necessary information for the CTR; (2) cus-
tomer frequently making cash purchases of bank checks for amounts under $10,000.00; (3)
customer coming to the bank with another customer, each of whom goes to different tell-
ers to transact large currency transactions, each of which is under $10,000.00. Id. at 226-
27. Another indicator of illegal activity is a customer who buys CD's and immediately uses
them as collateral for a loan, or who unexpectedly pays down a large loan. Id. at 227. It is
noteworthy that any of these actions taken independently are wholly legitimate. Thus, as
Beiley suggests, they may be used as examples of indicia, a practice condemned by this
author.
Finally, there are certain factors which could be particularly sensitive because there
might be warning signals regarding loans, as follows: (1) a loan that has no clear and
express purpose other than to "Cash out" property unfree and clear; (2) the name borrow-
ers of foreign shell corporations with no other assets or business, no prior dealings with
the bank, no accountant-prepared financial statements, and no source of repayment other
than the sale of property; (3) customer insists on quick closing and requests a transfer of
the closing funds abroad; (4) the customer seeking credit has no concern for the cost of
the loan; and (5) the customer is evasive about the purpose of the loan. Id. at 227.
Again, these factors are simply indicia of venal conduct which could be legitimate
conduct. What is significant here is that it is the banks that have to be concerned with
obtaining all or some of the above information lest they risk being held responsible for the
nefarious activity that the commercial transactions are masking. So the bank's role ranges
from quasi-enforcer to wrongdoer, a role that can be separated by the asking of a few
questions. Significantly, should the government seek to ask those questions it could be
deemed an unacceptable invasion of an individual's privacy.
213 See infra notes 214 and 215 and accompanying text.
214 See 12 U.S.C. § 4701(c).
215 31 U.S.C. § 5315.
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In fact, the infamous Kerry Amendment provides that if such
exchanges are not negotiated, the President is authorized to termi-
nate banking relations with other countries after November of
1990.217 By mid-1990, the United States was negotiating such trea-
ties with twenty-one unidentified countries.218 In November of
1990, the United States concluded with Venezuela the sole such
agreement. 219 It is significant that these agreements essentially call
on foreign governments to adopt the United States' regulations 'with
respect to reporting and record-keeping of transfers in amounts ex-
ceeding $10,000. Aside from the Kerry Amendment proposals, the
United States successfully concluded bilateral agreements with the
United Kingdom;220 Switzerland;22 1 the Cayman Islands;222 the Ba-
hamas; 223 Belgium;224 Canada;225 Mexico; 226 Thailand;2 27 and the
Netherlands, including Aruba and the Antilles. 228
In sum, the United States has made great efforts to fight drug
trafficking and money laundering, but has done so at the expense of
216 Id.
217 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
218 Some of these countries included Netherlands (with Aruba and the Antilles), Aus-
tralia, Bahamas, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Italy, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, Spain and Uraguay. Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note
2, at 62.
219 Agreement between the United States and Venezuela regarding cooperation in the
prevention and control of money laundering arising from illicit trafficking in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, November 5, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No. 43, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter U.S.-Venezuela Agreement].
220 Agreement concerning the Investigating of Drug Trafficking Offenses and the
Seizure and Forfeiture of the Proceeds and Instrumentalities of Drug Trafficking, C.M. No.
755 (1989).
221 U.S. - Swiss Treaty, supra note 122.
222 Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ieland Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters,July 3, 1986, S. Treaty Doc. No. 8, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
223 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Baha-
mas on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, August 18, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 17,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
224 Treaty between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 28, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 16, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
225 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
226 Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mex-
ican States for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 13, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1988).
227 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of Thailand on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 19,
1986, S. Treaty Doc. No. 18, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
228 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, June 12,
1981 S. Treaty Doc. No. 16, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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individual privacy rights. 229 In effecting its goals, pursuant to the
BSA and RFPA, it has placed much of the enforcement responsibility
on financial institutions, effectively making them the source of other-
wise private financial information. The existing onus will be in-
creased if the pending legislation passes. In this process, banks
become quasi-enforcers, collecting for, and reporting to, the govern-
ment with respect to individual depositors' financial activity. These
reporting requirements all but obliterate individuals' privacy rights
without regard to the legitimacy of their financial dealings and, sig-
nificantly, without regard for individuals' legitimate interests in keep-
ing their financial life private - in the name of the war on drugs.
At the outset, the United States was alone in the fight against
drug trafficking and money laundering. However, it quickly became
evident that effective combat against these activities necessitated in-
ternational cooperation. Because the fight against drug trafficking
and drug-related money laundering offenses is a necessary and ap-
propriate one, and because the United States is a strong, powerful
entity in the international finance world, other nations have followed
suit and have enacted anti-drug trafficking and money laundering
laws which include strong pro-government enforcement provisions
such as provisional remedies and asset forfeiture. Moreover, the
global initiatives have followed the United States' lead regarding the
use of indicia. These international efforts against drug trafficking
and money laundering are discussed in the following section.
V. International Efforts Against Drug Trafficking and Money
Laundering
With the recent focus on the large and free flow of drug money,
it has not only been the United States, but myriad and diverse juris-
dictions that have enacted statutes to curb drug trafficking and illegal
money laundering. 230 Even strong bank secrecy jurisdictions have
enacted such legislation. In addition, the international community
has banded together to use their combined strengths to curb the ve-
nal activity. Subsection A discusses foreign sovereigns' domestic ef-
forts against drug trafficking and money laundering and subsection B
discusses international and regional initiatives.
229 As one commentator noted, "[m]oney laundering will be the crime of choice in
white-collar prosecutions in the 90's." BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS CRIMINAL AFFAIRS
PRAcrICE MANUAL, June 12, 1991.
230 See United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 41, 198 (Mar. 1989) (regarding Bahamas
and Costa Rica); see also Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 65, at 467, 485 (outlining legisla-
tive developments in foreign countries).
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A. Foreign Sovereigns' Domestic Efforts at Fighting Drug Trafficking
and Money Laundering
Significantly, in 1990, Switzerland adopted legislation criminal-
izing money laundering. The Swiss law covers obstruction of investi-
gations into underlying criminal activity, discovery of criminally
derived assets and confiscation of criminally derived assets. 23' This
provision has extra-territorial reach. Thus, pursuant to a dual crimi-
nality provision, an offender can be punished in Switzerland if s/he
committed the principal offense in a jurisdiction where the conduct
also was criminal. 232 The new Swiss legislation also penalizes per-
sons who, acting within the scope of their profession, accept third-
party funds with the purpose of depositing, investing or transferring
the funds without verifying the identity of the beneficial owner. 23 3
Both crimes can only be committed by natural persons; there is no
corporate criminal liability even though the perpetrator may have
been acting in the ordinary course of business as an officer or agent
of a company.2 34
Swiss law makes money laundering punishable by up to five
years in prison and a maximum fine of one million Swiss francs. 23 5 A
banker who fails to meet the due diligence standard established may
be imprisoned for up to one year. 23 6 Moreover, amounts obtained in
illegal drug trafficking are forfeitable. Finally, Swiss law makes bank
records available to United States officials under certain circum-
stances. 2 37 Liechtenstein has prepared forthcoming legislation based
on the Swiss model.2 38 Beyond the law, Swiss bankers have agreed
231 Code Penal art. 305 Bis (Switz.) If the perpetrator was a member of organized
crime or a gang member or a professional money launderer, the law provides for en-
hanced penalties. Id. Knowledge may be established directly by showing actual knowl-
edge or constructive knowledge or indirectly by reckless disregard or willful blindness.
232 Code Penal art. 305 Bis (Switz.).
233 Code penal art. 305 Ter (Switz).
234 See generally Karp, Foreign Treaties, Legislation And Other International Developments,
1991 Money Laundering Enforcement Update: Compliance and Enforcement Issues
Course Materials 486. It is believed by the legal profession that the enactment of article
305 Ter would require changes in form B which permitted a professional such as an attor-
ney to open a bank account for a client without disclosing the client's identity to the bank
and in effect take responsibility for the client. But by reason of the banker's obligation to
know the beneficial owner, the use of form B has been abolished by the Swiss banking
authorities. Id.
235 Code Penal art. 305 Bis. These are the maximum penalties under the enhanced
penalty provision.
236 Code Penal art. 305 Ter. In this regard, Swiss law goes beyond American efforts.
For a discussion of the Swiss law see Scott E. Mortman, Putting Starch in European Efforts To
Combat Money Laundering, 60 FORD. L. REV. S429, S441-46 (1992) [hereinafter Mortman].
237 Peters, New Swiss Disincentives Against Money Laundering, INT'L FIN. L.R., August
1990, at 10. Before the new Swiss legislation, money laundering was not illegal to Switzer-
land. Id. However, since 1977, Swiss Banks entered into the agreement of Due Care,
imposing, inter alia, a duty of due care in the identification of account-holders and deposi-
tions. Id.
238 Liechtenstein advised the task force that it already applied a large number of task
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to verify voluntarily the identity of beneficial parties to bank transac-
tions. 23 9 Significantly, although these new laws and voluntary regu-
lations do have an effect on financial privacy, Swiss bank secrecy laws
stand intact.
The United Kingdom enacted the Drug Trafficking and Offenses
Act under which copies of bank records may be provided to foreign
jurisdictions when there is a criminal charge against the account
holder.240 Section 24 of the Act makes it an offense to retain pro-
ceeds of drug activity. 241 However, unless suspicion exists that the
money is linked to drugs, no duty to report exists.242 Recently, the
case of Barclays Bank PLC. (Trading As Barclaycard) v. Taylor clarified
that a bank is under no duty to contest an application for an access
order sought by police or to inform the client that the application has
been made.24 3
The United Kingdom also has adopted asset forfeiture provi-
sions. Originally, availability of forfeiture orders was limited to drug
trafficking, but England extended forfeiture to other offenses in the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988. The Criminal Justice (International
Co-operation) Act of 1990 provides the framework for seizing assets
pursuant to foreign forfeiture requests that are predicated on crimes
or correspond to crimes under certain United Kingdom statutes.244
In December of 1990, the Bank of England and the Building So-
cieties Commission, in collaboration with the British Bankers' Asso-
ciation, The Building Societies Association and the National Drug
Intelligence Unit of the New Scotland Yard, issued "Guidance Notes
force recommendations and will implement the rest in its forthcoming legislation that is
based on the Swiss model. See also Karp, supra note 234, at 492.
239 Swiss Banking Code of Conduct.
240 Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, ch. 32 (Halsbury's 4th ed. 1989) [hereinafter
Drug Trafficking Offenses Act].
241 The Drug Trafficking Offenses Act provides in pertinent part:
(I) [I]f a person enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby:
(a) the retention or control by or on behalf of another (call his "A") of A's proceeds
of drug trafficking is facilitated (whether by concealment, removal from the juris-
diction, transfer to nominees or otherwise), or
(b) A's proceeds of drug trafficking:
(i) are used to secure that funds are placed at A's disposal; or
(ii) are used for A's benefit to acquire property by way of investment, knowing
or suspecting that A is a person who carries on or has carried on drug
trafficking or has benefitted from drug trafficking, he is guilty of an offense.
Drug Trafficking Offenses Act, 1986, chs. 24, 32.
242 Carr, How To Recognize A Money Launderer, INT'L FIN. L. REv., August 1989, at 12
[hereinafter Carr].
243 Barclays Bank PLC. (Trading As Barclaycard) v. Taylor, I W.L.R. 1066 (1989).
244 Section 14 of the Act makes it an offense if a person conceals, disguises, transfers
or removes property that s/he knows or has reason to suspect is derived in whole, or in
part, from drug trafficking proceeds. Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act,
1990, ch. 4. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act of 1989 allows for-
feiture of money or property within the defendant's control at the time of and to be used
in connection with offenses of giving, soliciting or receiving aid for terroristic acts. Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 5.
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for Banks and Building Societies" ("Notes") - a set of rules con-
cerning money laundering. 245 The Notes suggest that covered finan-
cial institutions establish policies, procedures and controls to report
suspicious transactions and provide numerous indicia of what may
constitute these transactions. 246 Among other things, institutions
should develop money laundering policies, oversee maintenance of
records of transactions, and ensure compliance with laws and coop-
eration with law enforcement authorities. The Notes also adopt the
"Know Your Customer" standard 247 and suggest record-keeping to
make information easily available in connection with
investigations. 248
The Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Anguilla, British Virgin Is-
lands, Turks and Caicos, and Bermuda have enacted legislation simi-
lar to that enacted in the United Kingdom.249 The Channel Islands
and Isle of Man have enacted legislation which criminalizes drug
money laundering and provides for confiscation. 250
In recent years, France has also enacted a wave of legislation.
Money laundering 25' and the international transfer of funds related
to drug trafficking 252 were criminalized in France 253 in late 1987 and
1988. In July of 1990, France supplemented these laws by imposing
a duty on financial institutions to disclose transactions they reason-
ably believe are related to drug proceeds. 254 Monaco, based upon its
relationship with France, will follow France's action.255 Other juris-
245 Guidance Notes for Banks and Building Societies from The Bank of England re-
printed in Charles A. Intriago, INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING: A EURO STUDY SPECIAL
REPORT, Appendix D [hereinafter "Notes"].
246 Id. Part V. Note 2 provides examples of suspicious transactions and lists eleven
examples of "Money LIundering Using Cash Transactions"; fifteen examples of "Money
Laundering Using Bank or Building Society Accounts"; five examples of "Money Launder-
ing Using Investment Related Transactions"; seven examples of "Money Laundering by
Off-Shore International Activity"; three examples of "Money Laundering Involving Finan-
cial Institution Employees and Agents"; and three examples of "Money Laundering by
Secured and Unsecured Lending." Id.
247 Id. Part III. To satisfy the know your customer standard an institution should ob-
tain: (a) name(s) used; (b) "correct" permanent address; (c) date of birth and (d) nation-
ality. The Notes specifically list documents that facilitate knowing the customer including
a passport and employer photo i.d. and rejects birth certificates, health cards and credit
cards as sole means of identification. Id.
248 Id. Part IV. The Notes recognize that, pursuant to the Drug Trafficking Offenses
Act courts may review past transactions to ascertain an individuals wrongdoing. Thus, the
Notes suggest that, when practicable, the following records should be kept: account open-
ing records (Notes, Part III); account ledger records; and records in support of entries in
whatever form, e.g., checks, etc.
249 These jurisdictions were preparing detailed responses to the recommendations of
the task force "and considering the need for administrative measures in the context of
local budget and resource constraints." Karp, supra note 234, at 492.
250 Karp, supra note 234, at 492.
251 See French Public Health Code, art. 627, section 3.
252 See French Customs Code, art. 415.
253 See Mortman, supra note 236, at S452 (on French law).
254 See Mortman, supra note 236, at S452 (on French law).
255 Karp, supra note 234, at 492.
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dictions which have enacted money laundering statutes include Ec-
uador, 25 6  Costa Rica, 2 57  Belgium, 25 8  Canada,259  and
Luxembourg. 260 In 1989, Canada passed money laundering and as-
set forfeiture legislation that broadly applied to designated drug of-
fenses and to "enterprise crime offenses," the latter including
murder, theft, extorsion, various types of fraud, and laundering the
proceeds of crime.26' Luxembourg, an important secrecy jurisdic-
tion, has anti-money laundering legislation that punishes hiding the
origin of funds from the sale of illegal drugs.2 62
In addition, anti-money laundering legislation is expected to fol-
low in Hong Kong and Argentina 263 and is being considered in Swe-
den and Germany.2 64 Significantly, in Hong Kong, whose secrecy
laws are derived from the Tournier decision, 265 client information is
highly protected although the city is believed to be a major launder-
ing site. However, in 1989, the Commissioner of Banking issued
guidelines to prevent criminal use of the banking system that empha-
size the principle "know your client."2 66 Mexico, Greece and Hong
Kong have passed broad asset forfeiture provisions. 267
Australia is the second nation, after the United States, that has
instituted a requirement that financial institutions file currency trans-
actions reports.2 68 It also has forfeiture provisions that apply to in-
256 See Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 44. Ecuador ratified the U.N. Drug Con-
vention on March 23, 1990.
257 See Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 44.
258 Charles. A. Intriago, Nations Act to Dam Up Illicit Funds, AMERICAN BANKER, July 24,
1989, at 22.
259 Bill C-61, § 420.1 (enacted Sept. 13, 1988). Canada ratified the UN Drug Conven-
tion on July 5, 1990.
260 See, Kellaway, Financial Services Come of Age, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1990 at Lux. IV,
col. 1. But see note 65 supra and accompanying text explaining that while money launder-
ing may be a crime, Luxembourg laws prohibit disclosure of financial information to en-
forcement authorities.
261 Bill C-61. In April 1990, the Canadian Superintendent of Financial Institutions
issued "Best Practices For Deterring and Detecting Money Laundering" which, among
other things, suggests a list of suspicious transactions. Canada signed the UN Drug Con-
vention in December 1988.
262 Loi du 7 juillet 1989 Portant Modification de la loi Modifiee du 19 Feurier 1973
Concernant ia Vente de Substances Medicamenteuses et la Lutte Contre la Toxicomanie
(Lux) cited in Circulaire IML 89/57 Nov. 15, 1989.
263 Intriago, supra note 258.
264 Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 23.
265 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (explaining Tournier decision).
266 Carr, supra note 242, at 13.
267 See Bruce Zagaris, International Update: Legislative, Treaty and Enforcement Developments
Abroad, 1991 Money Laundering Enforcement Update: Compliance and Enforcement Is-
sues Course Materials 465, 480 [hereinafter Zagaris, Update]. Mexico ratified the UN Drug
Convention on April 11, 1990.
268 The Proceeds of Crime (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1987, § 81 (1987); Aus-
tralia has a form entitled "Australian Significant Cash Transaction Report of $10,000 or
more" as well as a form entitled "Australian International Currency Transfer Report of
$5,000 or more," reprinted in, Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at Appendix B (27, (3))
[hereinafter Australia, Report Forms, Appendix B]; see also, Intriago, supra note 258.
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dictable offenses. 269 Australia has a detailed "Suspect Transaction
Report" 270 which requests the following information: (1) the identity
of persons who conducted the transaction, 27' (2) the persons or or-
ganizations on whose behalf the transaction was conducted, 272 (3)
the details of the transaction,273 (4) the grounds for suspicion, (5)
the details of cash dealer/ place of transaction, and (6) a statement of
the cash dealer which includes a statement of what law the officer
suspects is being breached. The Cash Transaction Reporting
Agency, formalizing use of indicia, issued guidelines which list "nar-
cotics source or transit countries" 274 and secrecy havens that are
deemed to facilitate money laundering. 275
Until recently, under Italian law, money laundering was a crime
only if the proceeds could be traced to more traditional organized
crime activities like kidnapping, robbery or blackmail. 276 Italy has
now taken steps to curtail its money laundering problem by criminal-
izing the laundering of all illegal proceeds. 277 Money laundering is
not an offense in the Netherlands, Austria or Japan.278 These for-
eign domestic laws indicate increased individual states' efforts to
curb drug trafficking and money laundering. Such efforts, however,
although leaving intact secrecy protections, increase reporting and
record-keeping requirements and incorporate indicia which do, or
may, result in the erosion of individuals' financial privacy.
B. International and Regional Initiatives Fight Drug Trafficking and
Related Money Laundering
In addition to the efforts of individual sovereigns, there have
269 Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2.
270 Australia, Report Forms, Appendix B (1), supra note 268.
271 This includes name, address, occupation, date of birth, means used to verify iden-
tity and transaction conducted.
272 This includes reporting the name of persons or organizations, including the given
name; address; occupation/nature of business.
273 The information to be provided includes type of transaction, date of transaction;
total amount of cash; total amount of transaction; if foreign currency, the type; if a cheque
is involved the name of the drawer, the payee or beneficiary; if another bank is involved
the name, branch and country; the details and numbers of all accounts involved in the
transaction, including the type of account.
274 The countries listed are Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Hong
Kong/Mecau, India, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Tur-
key and Venezuela. See Intriago, EUROsTUDY, supra note 2, at 79.
275 The secrecy havens listed are Bahamas, Bermuda, British Channel Islands, British
Virgin Islands, Cayman Island, Cook Islands, Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong Kong, The Isle of
Man, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Nauru, Netherland Antilles, Panama, Switzer-
land, Tonga, and Vanyatu. Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 79.
276 Bruce Zagaris & Markus Bornheim, Cooperation In Fight Against Money Laundering In
Context of European Community Integration, 3 BANKING REP. (BNA), at 121 (Jan. 22, 1990).
277 West's European Update, Banking and Financial Services, 1991 WL 11696 at *65,
available in WESTLAW, Eurupdate Database.
278 Crocker, Bankers Police Yourselves, INr'L FIN. L. REV., June 1990, at 10 [hereinafter
Summit Report Highlights].
[VOL. 18
INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING
been international and regional efforts, including multilateral and bi-
lateral arrangements 279 aimed at curbing drug trafficking and money
laundering. One significant effort is the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(U.N. Drug Convention). 280 As of December 31, 1990, thirty-two
nations ratified, acceded to, or approved the Convention. 28' The
Convention, which entered into force on November 11, 1990,282 es-
tablishes the offense of money laundering for drug-related offenses
and the aiding and abetting of such offenses. 283 It requires that sig-
natories enact laws that criminalize money laundering.284 The Con-
vention includes asset forfeiture provisions 285  and requires
rendering mutual legal assistance for the crimes covered by the
Convention.28 6
One significant aspect of the asset forfeiture policy is that it obli-
gates members to undertake cooperative measures. Furthermore,
the U.N. Drug Convention encourages each signatory country to
adopt measures that will enable it to confiscate proceeds derived
from property and instrumentalities related to prescribed drug of-
fenses and obligates the signatory countries to try to conclude bilat-
eral and multilateral treaties in this regard. 287 The U.N. Drug
Convention authorizes confiscation of the proceeds derived from
treaty offenses or the equivalent in other property.288 It also autho-
rizes the tracing of proceeds into other property and even places the
burden of proof regarding the "lawful origin" of the property on the
owner or custodian of the property involved. 289 Significantly, the
U.N. Drug Convention specifically provides that "[a] party shall not
decline to render mutual legal assistance ... on the ground of bank
secrecy." 290 Rather, legal assistance may be refused only if execut-
ing the request "is likely to prejudice [the requested state's] sover-
279 These agreements are generally referred to as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATS) whereby the parties agree to cooperate in the investigations and prosecution of
criminal cases. See generally, Zagaris, supra note 98, at 495-96 (listing MLAT's of various
countries). See also supra notes 219-228 (listing MLAT's)
280 UN Drug Convention, supra note 5.
281 Nations Which Have Ratified, Acceded To, or Approved the 1988 United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs, Through December 31, 1990, Money Laundering Alert,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MLA File.
282 Under UN rules the Convention became effective upon the "deposit of the twenti-
eth instrument of ratification, approval or accession." UN Drug Convention, supra note 5,
art. 29(2).
283 Id. art. 3
284 Id. arts. 2, 3.
285 Id. art. 5.
286 Id. art. 7.
287 Id. arts. 5, 7.
288 Id. art. 5.
289 Id.
290 Id. art. 7(5).
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eignty, security, order public, or other essential interests. ' 29 1 The
Convention further provides that "[i]n order to carry out the meas-
ures referred to in this article, each party shall empower its courts or
other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commer-
cial records be made available or be seized." °29 2 A party cannot fail
to act under this article of the convention on "the ground of bank
secrecy." 293
In addition to requiring cooperation in the investigation stage,
the U.N. Drug Convention requires signatories to adopt provisional
measures - measures necessary to enable the competent authorities
to identify, trace, freeze or seize for the purpose of eventual confisca-
tion of proceeds, property, instrumentalities or any items that are
used or are intended for use in the commission of any of the offenses
within the Convention.29 4 In taking provisional measures, the re-
quested state must act in accordance with the provisions of its do-
mestic law and its procedural rules or any binding bilateral or
multilateral treaty or agreement entered into by the requesting
state. 29 5 Such measures are essential to asset forfeiture policy be-
cause otherwise, criminals would be able to remove a property from
their requested state. 296
On July 25, 1990, the select committee of experts of the Council
of Europe prepared the draft version of the Convention on Launder-
ing, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of Proceeds From Crime 29 7
("European Laundering Convention") which, upon signature by
twelve governments, was adopted by the Council on November 8,
1990.298 Under the European Laundering Convention, the offense
of money laundering consists of facilitating the conversion of pro-
ceeds of a crime and covers property used for knowingly and inten-
tionally disguising the illicit origin of the proceeds that can be traced
291 Id. art. 7(15)(b).
292 Id. art. 5(3).
293 Id.
294 Id. art. 7(2)(a)-(g).
295 Id. art. 7(4).
296 See Zagaris, Update, supra note 267, at 484.
297 Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds from Crime, Nov. 8, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 148 [hereinafter European Launder-
ing Convention]. See also Zagaris, Update, supra note 267, at 473. In addition to the experts
from the sixteen Council of Europe countries, the group of experts consisted of experts
from Australia, Canada and the United States, as well as Interpol, the United Nations, the
International Association of Penal Law, at the International Penal and Penitentiary Foun-
dation, and the International Society of Social Defense. Id. at 472. The United States is
contemplating becoming a signatory. However, if it does so without entering reservations,
it would have to enact domestic legislation to allow it to comply with some of the terms.
See, e.g., id. at 473.
298 European Laundering Convention, supra note 297. Twelve countries signed it on
November 8, 1990, ihe first day the convention became open for signature: Belgium,
Cypress, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The Convention becomes effective January 1, 1993. Id.
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thereto.299 The European Laundering Convention, unlike the UN
Drug Convention300 and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Recommendations, 30' does not limit criminal money laundering to
drug-related money laundering; rather, the European Convention
adopts a very broad scope with respect to subject offenses.30 2 Con-
sistent with the growing international consensus on the issue, bank
secrecy is not grounds upon which cooperation may be declined: the
European Laundering Convention specifically provides that "a party
shall not invoke bank secrecy as a ground to refuse any cooperation
under this chapter. '303
The European Laundering Convention provides that when a re-
questing state has begun criminal or confiscation proceedings, a re-
quested state must take the necessary provisional measures such as
freezing or seizing to prevent any dealing in transfer or disposal of
property which, at a later stage, may be the subject of or satisfy a
request for confiscation.30 4 A state that has received a request for
confiscation measures concerning instrumentalities or proceeds lo-
cated in its territory has a duty to take provisional measures to pre-
vent the transfer or disposal of property which might later satisfy the
confiscation requirement.30 5 The European Laundering Convention
provides that the provisional measures will be implemented as per-
mitted by, and in accordance with, the domestic law of the requested
state and, to the extent compatible with such law, in accordance with
the procedures specified in the request.30 6
The European Community also has made various arrangements
with respect to drug trafficking and money laundering.307 For exam-
ple, the Council of Ministers308 has begun to enforce regulations
299 European Laundering Convention, supra note 297, art. 6(l)(a)-(b).
300 UN Drug Convention, supra note 5.
301 Financial Action Task Force Report (Feb. 7, 1990). See infra notes 341-362 on the
efforts of FATF.
302 European Laundering Convention supra note 297, art. 6(1). Note that the Euro-
pean Convention, while based on the U.N. Drug Convention, does not limit criminaliza-
tion of money laundering to drug related matters. The subject offenses include drug
trafficking, terrorist offenses, organized crime, violent crimes, offenses involving the sexual
exploitation of children and young persons, extorsion, kidnapping, environmental of-
fenses, economic fraud, insider trading and other serious offenses. See Council of Europe,
Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of the Proceeds of Crime, point 27 (1990). The Convention, however, allows states to
enter reservations restricting cooperation under the Convention to certain offenses or cat-
egories of offenses. European Laundering Convention, supra note 297, art. 2(2).
303 European Laundering Convention, supra note 297, art. 18(7).
304 European Laundering Convention, supra note 297, art. 7.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 The Member states of the European Community are Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom.
308 The Council of Ministers is a decision-making body which enacts legislation pro-
posed by the Commission. The Council consists of representatives of the governments of
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against money laundering. The Council of Ministers issued resolu-
tions proposing to take steps to amend customs regulations, among
other things, to provide for seizure of goods related to drug
activity.309
On June 10, 1991, the ECOFIN Council of Ministers for the Eu-
ropean Community adopted unanimously, a Proposal for a Council
Directive on Prevention of the use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering to enforce its anti-money laundering
policy.3 10 The Directive criminalizes money laundering of funds de-
rived from drug trafficking and other criminal offenses. 3 1' Like the
European Laundering Convention, the Directive reaches money
laundering derived from other than just drug-related offenses.3 1 2
The Directive provides that "knowledge" or "intent" regarding
a proscribed activity may be inferred from "objective factual circum-
stances."3 1 3 Jurisdictionally, the Directive criminalizes money laun-
dering even where the activities are generated and the property
exists in the territory of another member state or in that of a third
country. 3 14 The coverage of branches with their headquarters
outside the EC also provides extraterritorial reach to the Directive
and insures its broad applicability.3 15
The Directive, like the United States laws, specifies enhanced
"know your customer" and "suspicious transactions" require-
ments. 3 16 For example, it requires banks and other credit and finan-
cial institutions to obtain identification from customers when they
open accounts or when they undertake a transaction of 15,000 Euro-
pean Currency Units or more.3 17 And, following the recommenda-
tions of the G-7 Financial Action Task Force, the Directive provides
for enhanced record-keeping.3 18 Finally, the Directive gives assist-
ance in relieving employees of responsibility for breaching restric-
tions on disclosure of information when they report information
concerning suspected money laundering to authorities in good
faith. 3 19
the member states. See SydneyJ. Key, Mutual Recognition: Integration of the Financial Sector in
the European Community, FED. R. BULL., at 593 (Sept. 1989).
309 Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 276, at 119.
310 Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L. 166) 77. The Council reached an agree-
ment on a common position on February 1991. See Zagaris, Update, supra note 267, at 473.
311 See Council Directive 91/308, supra note 310, at 79.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 It requires member states to insure that credit and financial institutions examine
with special attention any unusual transaction they regard as particularly likely, by its na-
ture, to be related to money laundering. Id.
317 Id. This is approximately $18,500 United States.
318 Particularly, financial institutions must keep copies of the customer identification
records for at least five years after the relationship with a customer terminates. Id.
319 See Council Directive 911/308, supra note 310, at 80.
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In sum, the Directive recognizes the EC's adoption of the strict-
est standards in the world, and commits to continue to work with the
FATF to insure application of comparable standards world-wide.
The Directive, with the European Laundering Convention,3 20 in-
sures broad criminalization of money laundering and a system for
cooperation in the regulation of international monetary transac-
tions.32 l A commentator notes that the importance of the EC's for-
eign policy and its significant position in the G-7, the OECD, the
U.N., and other groups, also will greatly enhance anti-money laun-
dering enforcement.3 22
The European Parliament 2 3 issued a report of the drug prob-
lem and urged the Community to review bank secrecy laws to allow
banks to provide information and freeze accounts when suspected
activity has taken place.3 24 Finally, the European Community,3 25 as
well as some of its member states, participate in the G-7 and G-10
initiatives with respect to drug trafficking and money laundering.3 26
A significant development in the intensified, international efforts
to combat drug trafficking and money laundering is the Basle Com-
mittee's statement of principles on money laundering. The Basle
Concordat is an agreement issued by the Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices.3 27 This committee is com-
prised of the central bank governors of the group of ten industrial-
ized countries (G-10).s28 The purpose of the Concordat, issued in
1974, was to agree about the respective roles of the home country
and home country supervisors with respect to financial institutions'
capitalization and to assure that banking organizations operating in
the international markets were supervised institutions.32 9 Generally,
320 European Laundering Convention, supra note 297.
321 See Zagaris, Update, supra note 267 at 475.
322 Id.
323 The European Parliament serves a limited legislative purpose. It authorizes the
EC budget and approves applications of prospective member states. It can also act as a
consultant to the Council on certain matters. The members of the European Parliament
are elected by individual citizens of the members states. See Key, supra note 308.
324 See Zagaris & Bornheim, supra note 276, at 119-20.
325 In a related EC effort, the European Commission has issued directives with respect
to cooperation methods necessary to combat international tax evasion and avoidance. Id.
at 119. The Commission is the executive branch of the European Community and is re-
sponsible for the proposal of legislation to be enacted by the Council. See Key, supra note
308.
326 See infra notes 327-362 and accompanying text.
327 The Basle Committee comprises representatives of the central bank and supervi-
sory authorities of the Group of Ten countries. OCC Issues Basic Committee Statement of Princi-
pies Against Money, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 218 (1989).
328 The group of 10 industrialized countries ("G-10") is comprised of Belgium, Can-
ada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, the United States and Luxembourg. Id. As noted earlier, the European Com-
munity also participates in the G-10.
329 For the text of the Basle Committee Statement, see INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS To
COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING 273-277 (Gilmore ed., 1992).
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this group's concern pertains to supervisory responsibilities regard-
ing solvency, liquidity and foreign exchange operations. 330 The
Concordat is revised sparingly as, for example, it was revised in 1983
so that it would reflect the actual experience of the participating
states. 331 The significant aspect of the 1989 statement of principles
is that it was the first time this body, primarily focused on capital
concerns, incorporated ethical standards of professional conduct and
spoke out against money laundering.
The G-10 promoted anti-money laundering principles for four
main reasons. First, the Committee wanted to insure that financial
institutions would obtain proper identification of all persons con-
ducting international business. Second, the Committee wished to in-
sure that the conduct of the bank's business would be in conformity
with the high ethical standards set forth in the principles. Third, the
Basle Committee sought assurances that cooperation with law en-
forcement authorities would take place within the confines of the ap-
plicable law. Fourth, the Committee sought that proper staff
training be conducted in all matters concerning the statement of
principles. 332
The statement of principles urges that banks undertake to know
their customers, 333 to spot suspicious transactions, 334 and to cooper-
ate fully with law enforcement authorities. 33 5 Specifically, the state-
ment of principles provides that when banks have a good reason to
suppose that money held on deposits is derived from criminal activ-
ity or that transactions made are themselves criminal in purpose,
banks should take appropriate legal measures. 336 For example,
banks should deny assistance, 337 sever relations with a customer,338
and close or freeze accounts connected with suspicious activities. 33 9
The Basle Committee's work resulted in the establishment of a
number of regional supervisory authorities. Recently, groups in the
Caribbean, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa were
established.3 40
Another significant international anti-drug related money laun-
dering enforcement initiative resulted from the efforts of the group
of seven (G-7) industrialized democracies. 34' In 1988, the G-7 coun-
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 274.
333 Id. at 276.
334 Id. at 277.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 See Zagaris, Update, supra note 267, at 472.
341 The group of seven industrialized democracies (G-7) is comprised of Canada,
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tries established a task force on international narcotics trade as part
of the effort to stop the production, trafficking and financing of ille-
gal drugs. A priority of the task force was the eradication of drug-
related international money laundering operations. 342 The final G-7
report sought to enhance international criminal cooperation on,
among other things, drug-money laundering.3 43 The report an-
nounced the establishment of the FATF,344 an international institu-
tion aimed at combatting drug-related money laundering.
The FATF's April 23, 1990 report recommended the following
to combat drug-related money laundering: (1) improvement of na-
tional legal systems;3 45 (2) enhancement of the role of financial sys-
tems;346 and (3) the strengthening of international cooperation. 347
The report required non-United States financial institutions to take a
greater role in guarding against and reporting drug money launder-
ing and other suspicious transactions.3 48 According to the report,
FATF members unanimously agreed that secrecy laws should not
stand in the way of implementing the recommendations. 349 It is
noteworthy, in this regard, that some of the participating countries
such as Switzerland, Australia and Luxembourg have strong secrecy
laws. Further, the report states that each country should take meas-
ures to criminalize drug money laundering as required by the United
France, Germany, Italy,Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The European
Community also participates.
342 Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 16.
343 This final report also addressed terrorism and the environment as areas in which
international cooperation was necessary. Id.
344 Aside from the G-7, the original task force members included participation by Aus-
tria, Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
The task force was to report with respect to what has been done and what needed to be
done with respect to money laundering. Id.; See generally Zagaris, supra note 98, at 535.
345 Recommendations 4-8. Recommendations 1-3 set out the general framework of
the report. Financial Action Task Force, supra note 301.
346 Recommendations 9-10, (recommendations pertaining to banks should also apply
to other financial institutions), (application should reach "as many organizations as possi-
ble that receive large cash payments in the course of their business"). Id.; see also Recom-
mendations 11-29.
347 States are encouraged to enter into a network of bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments and arrangements using generally shared legal concepts to provide practical meas-
ures to affect the widest possible range of mutual assistance. Countries should implement
compulsory measures for mutual assistance in criminal matters, including giving the gov-
ernment authority to take expeditious action in response to a request by foreign countries
to identify, freeze, seize, and confiscate proceeds or other property of corresponding value
to such proceeds based on money laundering or the crimes underlying the laundering
activity. Id.
348 Recommendations 23, 24. An important agreement the G-7 reached was that each
government should furnish spontaneously or "upon request" international information
relating to suspicious transactions and the persons and corporations involved in those
transactions. It suggests that safeguards be established to insure that the exchange of
information is consistent with national and international provisions and privacy protec-
tions. However, no consensus was reached with regard to whether suspicious activity re-
porting should be mandatory or permissive. Id.
349 Recommendation 2.
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Nations Drug Convention.a50 The FATF went beyond the UN Drug
Convention, however, by directing member governments to consider
extending the offense of money laundering to any other crime to
which a link to narcotics exists.35' In the alternative, the report rec-
ommends extending the offense of money laundering to all offenses
that generate a significant amount of proceeds or to certain serious
offenses.3 52
Pursuant to the U.N. Drug Convention model, the FATF report
also calls for the adoption of forfeiture provisions, including forfei-
ture from proceeds derived from proscribed activities, provisional
measures, and broad investigative measures. 353 The report suggests
that financial institutions' regulators operate together with law en-
forcement authorities to ensure that institutions have adequate
money laundering prevention procedures. 354 The report also sug-
gests enhancing the role of the financial system by implementing
"know your customer" rules - rules that require financial institu-
tions to identify customers, disallow anonymous accounts and keep
financial records. 355 It also suggests development of a system that
identifies suspicious transactions3 56 while insulating financial institu-
tions and their employees from liability if such transactions are re-
ported. 357 Finally, the recommendations are that such standards
apply not only to banking but also to non-banking financial institu-
tions. 358 The report considers the advantages of CTRs and, notwith-
standing opposition by most of the group, it suggests that countries
establish, or at least consider establishing, such a system. 359 This
initial proposal made no recommendation concerning money laun-
dering through international wire transfers.
350 Id.
351 Recommendation 5. The United Kingdom adopted this approach in the Drug Traf-
ficking Offenses Act, which other Commonwealth governments such as Hong Kong have
followed. Id.
352 Id. The United States and Australian laws take this approach.
353 Recommendation 8. The report recommends forfeiture of instrumentalities used
in or intended for use in the commission of any money laundering offense, or profert of
corresponding value. It also provides for provisional measures and further provides that
there should be authority to take expeditious action or response to requests by foreign
countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate proceeds of other property of corre-
sponding value to such proceeds, based on money laundering or the crimes underlying the
laundering activity. Id.
354 See generally Recommendations 9-40.
355 Recommendations 12, 13, 14. In fact, to comply with the Basle Statement of prin-
ciples, financial institutions suspecting that funds were derived from criminal activity
should be allowed or required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent au-
thorities. Id. See supra notes 327-340 for discussions of Basle principles.
356 Recommendations 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22.
357 Recommendations 16, 18.
358 Summit Report Highlights, supra note 178. The recommendations of the report
are non-binding, but are likely to be implemented by the participating countries. Id.
359 Recommendations 23, 24. Financial Action Task Force, supra note 301, Recom-
mendations 23, 24.
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In May, 1991, the FATF issued a second report3 60 which found
that the majority of participants in the first report substantially im-
plemented the full range of recommendations. This report, expressly
incorporating indicia, targeted the following groups as high-risk pro-
fessions or institutions: (1) organizations whose prime function is to
provide a form of financial service but which fall outside the scope of
the regulated financial sector;36' (2) organizations whose primary
purpose is to offer some form of gambling activity; (3) organizations
whose primary function is to buy and sell high-value items such as
precious metals and gem dealers, auction houses, real estate agents,
automobile, airplane and boat dealers; and (4) professionals who, in
the course of providing professional services, offer client account fa-
cilities such as lawyers, accountants, notaries and certain travel
agents.3 62 The principal problem identified by the second report
was still the export of cash to regulatory havens where deposits are
accepted, followed by wire transfers back into regulated financial in-
stitutions through transactions structured to avoid the reporting
threshold.
The task force identified the three most important regulatory
havens: Hong Kong, Singapore and the Gulf states. Of these, Hong
Kong is reported to have been receptive to initiatives to curb drug-
money laundering. On behalf of the individual Gulf states, a repre-
sentative of the Gulf Cooperation Council participated in one FATF
meeting, but did not endorse the recommendations due to political
unrest. Singapore is still considered to be a problem although the
report indicated that it informally agreed to participate in anti-drug
money laundering efforts. Other regulatory havens were reported to
be cooperating to varying degrees. For example, the Netherland's
endorsement of all the recommendations includes the Netherland
Antilles and Aruba for whose compliance the Dutch government
agreed to take responsibility.
Two major efforts are presently underway in the Caribbean to
curb money laundering. First, is the formation of the Caribbean Fi-
nancial Action Task Force (CFATF). In a June 1990 Caribbean Drug
Money Laundering Conference, leading governments in the region
committed themselves to take action against drug money launder-
ing.363 The governments agreed to consider the forty recommenda-
360 The number of participants in the task force increased to include Denmark, Fin-
land, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, Hong Kong and the Gulf
Cooperation Council which includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab
Emirates and Qatar. Intriago, EUROSTUDY supra note 2, at 17.
361 For example, bureaux de change, check cashers and money transmission services, in-
cluding those provided throughout correspondent relations outside the formal banking
sector. Id.
362 It is noteworthy that the targeted high-risk groups coincide with the indicia articu-
lated by U.S. laws, regulations and judicial opinions. Id.
363 The attenders included representatives of the governments of Aruba, the Baha-
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tions of the G-7 FATF, plus twenty-one additional recommenda-
tions.
The CFATF recommended that confiscation measures apply to
criminal proceeds and to precursor and essential chemicals, equip-
ment and materials used for the illicit manufacture, preparation, dis-
tribution and use of narcotic drugs.3 64  The CFATF's
recommendations, like the FATF recommendations, do not have the
effect of law and, therefore, do not obligate member countries to
cooperate with each other in executing asset forfeiture requests.3 65
The second Caribbean effort is under the auspices of the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS). 366 In November of 1986, the OAS
General Assembly approved the Interamerican Program of Action of
Rio dejaneiro (Rio Program) against the illicit use and production of
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and traffick therein.3 67
The Rio Program defined national and inter-american measures re-
quired to fight drug trafficking.3 68 The Rio Program urged the crea-
tion of a regional Interamerican Drug Abuse Control Commission
(CICAD) 369 whose defined mission is to implement laws and regula-
tions criminalizing money laundering, authorizing confiscation of
drug-related money and property, and relaxing bank secrecy laws to
facilitate drug investigations.
In 1990, at a meeting held in Ixtapa, regional representatives
articulated CICAD's priorities. 370 In the area of money laundering,
mas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Columbia,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, France, Hondura, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands,
the Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago,
the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela.
364 See Zagaris, Update, supra note 267, at 481.
365 However, the recommendations do provide that countries should have the author-
ity to seize, freeze and confiscate, at the request of a foreign state, property located in the
jurisdiction regardless of whether the owner of the property or any person who committed
the offense is present or has been present in the jurisdiction. Id.
366 See Charter of the Organization of American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361,
119 U.N.T.S. 3 (done at Bogota on April 30, 1948; entered into force on December 31,
1951), establishing the OAS as a regional agency.
367 This is significant because Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, the world's largest produ-
cers of cocaine, and the United States, the largest consumer of, and largest spender in,
illegal drugs, are all members of the OAS. See Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 38.
368 Top priority was aimed at measures designed to reduce demand for drugs, and
included a preventive education, treatment and rehabilitation program. The program
called for the unification of drug control agencies to plan, implement and coordinate com-
prehensive national policies and programs. The Rio Program emphasized the need for
measures to align relevant legislation among OAS members authorizing forfeiture of as-
sets derived from illicit drug trafficking, while controlling materials essential for manufac-
ture of drugs and psychotropic substances, supporting crop substitution and eradication of
illicit production, and the building of an effective system of cooperation among anti-drug
agencies and decidual systems of member states. Id.
369 La Comici6n Interamericana Contra El Abuso de las Drogas. CICAD is an autono-
mous regional organization within the OAS.
370 The articulation of priorities occurred during the Interamerican Meeting of Minis-
ters in Ixtapa, Mexico, where regional representatives approved the program of action of
Ixtapa. At that time, the OAS issued a "Declaration and Program of Action" and eighteen
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states should take action: (1) to emphasize the need for legislation
that defines as a crime all activity related to the laundering of prop-
erty and proceeds related to illicit drug trafficking and which makes it
possible to identify, trace, seize and forfeit such property and pro-
ceeds; (2) to recommend that member states encourage banks and
financial institutions to cooperate with the competent authorities to
prevent the laundering of property and proceeds related to illicit
drug trafficking, and to facilitate the identification, tracing, seizure
and forfeiture of such property and proceeds; (3) to recommend the
member states to develop mechanisms and procedures for bilateral
and multilateral cooperation to prevent laundering of property and
proceeds related to illicit drug trafficking and facilitate the identifica-
tion, tracing, seizure and forfeiture of such property and proceeds;
and (4) to recommend drafting model regulations in accord with the
U.N. Drug Convention, including bank secrecy not getting in the way
of law enforcement, as well as reporting requirements. 3 7 '
In November of 1991, a group of experts met to develop model
money laundering and asset forfeiture regulations for adoption as
agreed upon by members at the Ixtapa meeting.372 The group of
experts is considering recommending a structure in which every
country establishes a regulatory government authority with parallel
national jurisdiction in order to promote international cooperation.
Such national authority would then review requests by financial insti-
tutions to operate in its country, establish training programs, secure
compliance with record-keeping and reporting requirements and
create guidelines for the detection of suspicious transactions. 373
Following United States jurisprudence on innocent ownership,
the draft legislation allows innocent third parties - "claimants" -
to assert a property interest in assets governments seek to forfeit. 374
The draft places the onus on the claimant to show: (1) innocence
regarding the predicate offense; (2) lack of knowledge about and lack
of consent to the illegal use; (3) s/he did all s/he reasonably could
expect to prevent illegal use; (4) s/he was not willfully blind to the
illegal use; and (5) s/he did not obtain the property from one con-
members, including powerful ones such as Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela,
and the United States subscribed to a resolution adopting the declaration. See Intriago,
EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 58-9.
371 See generally Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 59.
372 Thirteen national experts representing Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela
comprised the group. The group is to recommend to the member states that they en-
courage financial institutions to cooperate with the competent authorities to facilitate the
identification, tracing, seizure and forfeiture or illegal proceeds from drug-money
laundering.
373 See Gimenez, Interamerican Measures to Combat Money Laundering: The OAS Model Regu-
lations and Draft Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 1991 Money Laundering Enforcement Up-
date: Compliance and Enforcement Issues Course Materials 499, 505.
374 Intriago, EUROSTUDY, supra note 2, at 41.
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victed of an offense under circumstances from which it reasonably
could be inferred that the transfer was for the purpose of avoiding
forfeiture.375
It is likely that the OAS model will follow the G-7, the CFATF
and the U.N. Drug Convention model limiting initiatives to drug-re-
lated offenses. Significantly, thirteen OAS member states already
ratified the U.N. Drug Convention.3 76
*I **
Similar to the purposes behind United States legislation, the
theory behind international agreements, regional efforts and domes-
tic (foreign) legislation is that in order to be effective in the fight
against drug trafficking and money laundering, policy must be
broad-based. Regulations must enable the governments not only to
obtain and to trace financial information but also to freeze, to seize
and to confiscate the instrumentalities and profits or benefits re-
ceived as a result of drug-related activity. The government can then
prevent criminals from having the means to commit future crimes
and can deprive them of the benefits of their illegal activity, and pun-
ish the venal conduct.
The similarity of concepts and principles among the United
States initiatives, the U.N. Drug Convention, the FATF and CFATF
recommendations, the CICAD initiatives, the Basle principles, the
EC directives and the European Laundering Convention, all in-
tended within a period of a few years, reflects the evolution of inter-
national theory. The substance of anti-money laundering
enforcement laws by inter-governmental organizations and interna-
tional organizations shows cooperation in information gathering and
sharing. It also reveals the trend to criminalize drug-related activity
by the enactment of remedies that are far-reaching, extending to
provisional freezing and seizure of assets as well as ultimate asset
forfeiture.
These initiatives also reflect a shift from zealous protection of
privacy to aggressive, pro-active government intervention in all
realms of international financial transactions. States willingly have
ceded sovereignty prerogatives, such as application of domestic se-
crecy protections, to cooperate and render assistance in drug-related
investigations. States even have agreed to modify domestic laws and
375 Intriago, EUROS-rUDY, supra note 2, at 41. Significantly, these provisions go beyond
United States law in that they require proof of both lack of knowledge and lack of consent
whereas the United States requirement is in the disjunctive. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4),
(6)(7).
376 The OAS states that have ratified the UN Convention are: the Bahamas, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Granada, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Para-
guay and the United States.
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procedures to comply with bilateral and multilateral treaties.3 77
It is evident from these efforts that the international community
has become united and focused in its effort to curb drug trafficking
and related money laundering. In this endeavor the international
community has adopted many of the approaches initially employed
by the United States and critically denounced by others. These new
global approaches, like the methods historically employed by the
United States, such as enhanced record-keeping, know your cus-
tomer standards, and suggested reporting requirements, particularly
those related to indicia of "suspicious transactions" are invasive of
an individual's hitherto sacrosanct financial privacy rights. Indeed, it
is significant that most initiatives expressly provide that bank secrecy
laws cede to the need to obtain information to fight the war on
drugs. Unlike the United States efforts, however, those initiatives
that limit the information-sharing and forfeiture proceedings to
drug-related crimes are more focused and, to that extent, are prefer-
able to those of the United States. The initiatives, nevertheless,
broad as they are, have the effect of unduly eroding privacy rights.
VI. Enforcement Run Amuck - A Hypothetical Case Study: The
Plight of Jose and Maria Ciudadanos 378
To bring to life the problems created for the average citizen by
these global efforts to fight drug money laundering, it is illustrative
to examine the hypothetical case of jos6 and Marifi Ciudadanos.
They are brother and sister and run the family business. Their par-
ents are holocaust survivors who settled in Estado Libre,379 South
America after fleeing Europe during WWII. The family business is a
travel agency, specializing in arranging tours of the Holy Land and in
making travel arrangements for those who choose to go to the
United States for medical treatment (Mayo Clinic and the like). As
part of, and as a supplement to, the travel agency business, Jos6 and
Maria also operate a money exchange house called a cambio. The
cambio operates in the parallel market where the rate of exchange is
more beneficial than the official rate set by the Banco Central, the
rate used by the government regulated financial institutions.38 0
Within the South American financial community, as a matter of
custom and practice, cambios perform quasi-banking functions in-
377 See, e.g., UN Drug Convention, supra note 5 (states agree to pass domestic legisla-
tion criminalizing drug trafficking and related money laundering).
378 English translation: Joseph and Mary Citizen.
379 English translation: Free State.
380 In South America, as a matter of custom practice, the parallel market is generally
either tolerated or encouraged by the government. For example, in Chile the parallel
market has been instrumental in that country's reduction of its foreign debt. Its legitimacy
was confirmed by regulation. Similarly, in other non-drug economies, such as Venezuela
and Argentina, the parallel market exists and is not only tolerated by the government but
it has been expressly legitimized by law.
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cluding the making of overseas payments on behalf of clients.
Cambios generally maintain accounts in United States dollars and/or
other hard currencies for a myriad of business purposes including
trading in foreign currencies and hedging against high inflation rates
common in many South American countries. Cambios also sell che-
ques and traveller's cheques and make foreign remittances.
Cambistas make deposits by instructing a third-country bank to
wire funds to a customer's account in the United States. In some
instances, cambistas may purchase money and deposit it in a third-
country bank account from others who are selling money. This
money then is wired either to the cambista's non-trading account
and then on to the customer's account or directly to the customer's
account. Cambios usually split commissions or co-broker deals with
other cambios. All the customer knows is that his/her money has
been transferred to his/her bank. Thus, keeping United States dol-
lar accounts is a common occurrence. This practice permits foreign
exchange houses to pay the United States dollar remittances they
sell, and to issue, as well as to accept, the proceeds of cheques in
United States dollars and traveller's cheques that cambios may
purchase.
As is the common practice, Jos6 and Marii have accounts in
United States Bank which they use not only for their exchange busi-
ness but also to pay for hotel reservations and other expenses related
to the travel agency. They also have personal accounts in United
States Bank. They explain that they prefer to keep their money in
the United States because of their family history and because of the
currency instability and high inflation rates in Estado Libre.
One day, without warning of any impending problem, Jos6 and
Marii receive a call from United States Bank apprising them that
their funds in their business and personal accounts have been frozen.
Apparently, Cambio Sucio,38 ' located in another South American
country, has wired funds back and forth with Cambio Limpio, s82 an-
other exchange house in Estado Libre, with which their cambio,
CambioJos6 MariAi, does business and co-broker deals. Significantly,
Jos6 and Marii were not even aware of the existence of Cambio
Sucio.
Simply, the problem arises from the fact that money is fungible
- making it the rarest of cases where someone's own cash is depos-
ited in his/her account. Rather, what goes into a person's account is
money from another source. Therefore, unless a person individually
makes every deposit into an account - a practice that in the business
world is at best a fantasy - there is a risk that one's clean money has
been commingled with dirty money. Notably, it is virtually impossi-
381 English translation: Dirty Exchange House.
382 English translation: Clean Exchange House.
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ble to know the source of a customer's funds or a co-broker's funds.
Nevertheless, if the government can trace any dirty money into an
account, the government can freeze or seize the entire account, re-
gardless of the account owner's innocent owner status or the account
owner's complicity in the underlying offense.
Jos6 and Marii, as is common in Latin America and particularly
in their business, bought United States dollars in the parallel market
and deposited these monies in their bank accounts. This parallel
market notion does not exist in the United States. More significant,
however, is the fact that irrespective of its legitimacy in Latin
America, the parallel market is seen as illegitimate in the United
States. In fact, in an investigation in which this author participated,
United States government representatives stated that if all cambios
went out of business and the parallel market were obliterated it
would be seen by United States authorities as a blessed occurrence.
The United States' view, which becomes indicia of illegal conduct, is
that parallel market funds are inherently suspect.38 3
Shocked, not to mention penniless, as virtually their whole net
worth has been frozen, Jos6 and Marii call the United States Coun-
sel, tell their story and seek advice. Most likely, the United States
Counsel, at best, will be able to tell them they are between a rock and
a hard place.
Certainly, Counsel first will tell them that they have a right to
reclaim their funds by showing they are innocent owners. Then,
however, she must tell them that the government may seek to stay
the innocent owner proceedings for an extended period pending res-
olution of any parallel criminal investigation. And Counsel also tells
them that if the funds can be traced to a drug transaction, no matter
how distant to their legitimate transactions, the government can
seize the bank account without showing that Jos6 and Marii actually
knew the funds were linked with drug proceeds. Further, United
States Counsel must tell Jos6 and Marii about indicia - that the
United States government is likely to take the position that anyone
who deals in the parallel market is not an innocent owner.
When Jos6 and Marii ask when they might have access to their
funds, counsel tells them that pending resolution of all proceedings,
the funds will remain frozen. Thus, Jos6 and Marifi may even lack
the funds to retain counsel as their entire net worth is in the frozen
accounts. Moreover, Jos6 and Marii will learn that their entire ac-
count, and not just the traceable proceeds, are forfeitable if the court
deems that the legitimate money provided cover for tainted funds,
thus facilitating money laundering. And it does not matter that they
were neither principals nor co-conspirators in the alleged criminal
383 See McGuirk & Tannenbaum, Frozen Money, 1991 Money Laundering Enforcement
Update: Compliance and Enforcement Issues Course Materials 458.
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activity.384
Counsel must explain that the objective of forfeiture laws is not
to give the government the power to freeze and seize money in the
hands of criminals.3 85 Rather, the goal is much broader and the ini-
tiatives extend far beyond drug traffickers and traditional notions of
money laundering. Receipt and deposit of criminally derived funds
even if for legitimate purposes, so long as these are traceable pro-
ceeds, is also criminalized. Apparently, government representatives
do not care if all foreign investors withdraw their deposits in United
States banks, accepting instead that "a war on flight capital is inevita-
bly part of the government's war on drugs because money launder-
ers, as well as legitimate people, use the 'parallel market' in
transferring money to the United States. The fact that there are in-
nocent foreign investors involved is unfortunate; but in a war there
are casualties."' 386 When Jos6 and Marii ask on what factual evi-
dence their money was frozen, counsel may well have to explain that
she does not know. But she further might have to explain that the
basis for the government's action could be inadmissible hearsay from
an unidentified source that likely will not appear at a hearing.
Jos6 and Marii are victims of a system of justice run amuck.
Globally, it appears that the decision is firm - fight drugs at all
costs. Jos6 and Marii are but casualties of this war. It is impossible
to ascertain how many Jos~s and Mariis fall prey to this war every
day. Their indictment and conviction is made possible courtesy of
the erosion of privacy and the use of indicia.
Note the government "got" them by making United States
Bank, their safety harbor in business and personal economic security,
reveal their business and personal financial practices. The govern-
ment also prevented United States Bank from lettingJos6 and Marii
know that information regarding their financial transactions was re-
quested. The investigation could be wholly based on inadmissible
hearsay. Evidence used against account holders can only be indicia
of bad acts - use of the parallel market - a practice that is neither
illegal nor shady but, rather, is a normal business practice for Jos6
and Marii. This plight is a result of "a mental attitude that has been
ingrained in investigative and legal authorities working in the area of
drug related offenses which seems to justify any and all actions taken
in the name of ... combatting drug wars." a387
384 See United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62 in Account No. 90-3617-3), Israel
Discount Bank, 754 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Haw. 1991) (court interprets "property involved in"
violations of money laundering statutes that is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
981 (a)(l)(A) to include all property that "facilitates" money laundering offenses).
385 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57.
386 Milne & Lovenzen, Counseling the Depositor, 1991 Money Laundering Enforcement
Update: Compliance and Enforcement Issues Course Materials 269 n.l.
387 Armstrong, An Update of Panamanian Legal Efforts Against Drug Offenses, 1991 Money
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This over-zealous enforcement attitude shackles its victims. Jos6
and Marii, without funds, have no real opportunity to mount an ade-
quate defense. Forget for a moment that with no assets they cannot
run their business to generate income. Without assets they cannot
hire a lawyer. And even if they could, they would have the onus of
showing that they are innocent owners, an onus that is impossible to
bear when the established rules use indicia which hold that users of
the parallel market cannot be innocent owners. In addition, they are
saddled with the indicia, believed by the government, the judge and
the public, particularly with respect to well-to-do Latin Americans
with assets in the United States, that if your account was seized you
must have been involved in drug trade. This is justice standing on its
head.
So what happens to the Jos6s and Mariis caught in this broad
net? Well, likely they will settle for large sums. At least it will end
the ordeal of litigation and return to them some of their assets not to
mention peace of mind and personal dignity. Forget the harm to
their reputation, both at home and in the United States. But what
about the rest of their lives? Certainly, to continue in business will
subject them to the cycle starting all over again.
More significantly, how do these actions affect the war on drugs?
Other than enrich government coffers so that there can be more fish-
ing expeditions, the answer is not much, if anything at all. "Getting"
Jos6s and Mariis is not going to have an impact on the traffick or
consumption of drugs. No evidence exists that the enactment and
enforcement of reporting and forfeiture laws has in any way curbed
the drug activity at which they are aimed. The purpose of civil forfei-
ture - "to deter and punish criminal activity"3 88 - is in no manner
furthered by proceeding civilly in a case where there is doubt as to
the criminal culpability of the persons whose accounts are frozen.
Rather, these actions have no bearing on the government's purpose
of "depriving the wrongdoer and the criminal community of prop-
erty that has been or will be useful in perpetuating or rewarding ille-
gal activity." 38 9
Clearly, anti-drug enforcement efforts in certain circumstances
are, at best, misdirected; and at worst, are overly broad. In all
events, these dragnet-style investigations and attempts at law en-
forcement unduly trammel privacy rights without any appropriate
basis. The following section details a proposal that will allow the
Laundering Enforcement Update: Compliance and Enforcement Issues Course Materials
510, 526
388 See Vol. II Department ofJustice Manual on Asset Forfeitures (hereinafter Dept. of
Justice Manual, Asset Forfeiture, (Prentice-Hall Law & Business) Vol. 11, B-44 (1990-2
Supp.) (emphasis in original deleted)).
389 Id.
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legitimate war on drugs to proceed while protecting others that have
been caught in the overly-zealous fishing expeditions.
VII. A Proposal for a Balanced Approach
It is indisputable that drug trafficking and drug-related money
laundering are venal activities. Consequently, joint international ef-
forts to eradicate such conduct are appropriate. However, current
efforts fail to protect adequately individuals' right to privacy, and
rather than a system of justice, many, like Jos6 and Marii, are exper-
iencing over-zealous enforcement. The following proposal seeks to
strike a balance - protecting individuals' privacy and allowing gov-
ernments domestically and internationally, to fight undesirable
activity.
First, the appropriate scienter standard is "knowledge" as pro-
posed by the G-7. This is a higher standard than has been applied,
for example, under the United States forfeiture laws, but yet, allows
flexibility because knowledge may be inferred from facts, thereby not
shackling the government against astute criminals. But the facts
from which enforcement groups may infer wrongdoing must be real
facts, not indicia of wrongdoing. A knowledge standard also offers a
higher level of protection for an individual than is presently provided
under the United States' interpretation of the forfeiture laws which
appear to allow an inference of misfeasance based on a light negli-
gence standard - much less than the willful blindness concept that
Congress originally had in mind. Moreover, in recognizing that ac-
tors in the international financial world are many and diverse, differ-
ent standards of knowledge should be applicable. A lesser
knowledge standard (i.e. more liberal allowance of inferential proof),
is warranted for direct participants, while a more stringent standard
(direct factual basis of knowledge), is appropriate for those whose
nexus with the dirty money or its traceable proceeds is more
attenuated.
Next, in order to protect against using "indicia" to prove illegal
conduct, all international efforts should contain "dual criminality"
provisions. Such provisions would be safeguards against overzeal-
ous efforts and would protect individuals from inferences of "bad
conduct" based on culturally-biased or insular grounds. This re-
quires, of course, that governments be culturally sensitive, rather
than arrogant, and look at the legitimacy of acts from which infer-
ences can be drawn accordingly. This is the application of lessons
that should have been learned long ago - dating to the early United
States experiences such as the Santa Fe case and the Swiss tax fraud
cases.
Third, Memoranda of Understanding between and among sov-
ereigns should set forth the express goals of their agreements (i.e.,
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deterrence of drug trafficking and drug money laundering). This
clarification of goals sets the parameters of cooperative efforts and
prevents the abusive use of such agreements as carte blanche to con-
duct broad-based fishing expeditions or culturally biased inappropri-
ate investigations. These memoranda should require periodic
analyses of whether the actions proscribed are effective in furthering
the goals of the agreements. If the actions being taken fail to further
the stated objective of eradicating drug trafficking and drug money
laundering then the approaches should be redesigned. If the gov-
ernmental actions do not further the goals, their allowance of privacy
invasions should cease.
In addition, forfeiture actions and interim remedies should be
limited to primary actors or to those against whom direct, admissible
evidence of wrongdoing exists. Any proof lacunae in the nexus that
must be established between the actor and the proscribed conduct
must be established by the government with factual proof and not
with innuendo or indicia. In all events, in forfeiture actions the gov-
ernment must bear the burden of proof. It must be the govern-
ment's obligation to establish that a frozen account holder is not an
innocent owner rather than require the person whose funds are fro-
zen to establish the absence of any relationship to the activity that
tainted the funds. This would require a change in the United States
law and the proposed Caribbean legislation. The government also
should have to establish what, if anything, a person realistically could
have done to avoid the "traceable proceeds" coming into his or her
account.
The roles of banks and financial institutions must be carefully
reconsidered. Presently, the "know your customer" and "suspicious
transaction" requirements both place too much of a burden on these
institutions and, simultaneously, give them too much power. The
burden is too great because a bank or financial institution particu-
larly with the use of indicia running rampant, never can know when it
will be deemed to know its customer well enough. It also gives the
financial institutions too much power because, conjoined with the
"suspicious transactions" reporting obligations, the banks and finan-
cial institutions become pseudo enforcers. These regulations en-
courage over-disclosure at the expense of an individual's privacy,
particularly when financial institutions seek to protect themselves
against liability and can act without any fear of private action by the
person whose financial information is disclosed so long as the finan-
cial institution acts in good faith.
In this regard, the "suspicious transaction" reporting require-
ments should be limited to those instances where the suspicions are
grounded on facts that provide knowledge of the customer's involve-
ment in the specified targeted activities - that is, drug-related
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crimes. Indicia should be disallowed as the sole basis for reporting
transactions as suspicious. It is absurd and offensive that wrongdo-
ing would be presumed by virtue of the origin of the funds or the
nationality of one or more of the transacting parties.
To assist where financial institutions have questions about cus-
tomers or transactions, an independent advisory board consisting of
experts who are representatives of various states and financial insti-
tutions should be established. This board could serve as a clearing-
house for indicia and could be used as a buffer between a financial
institution and an official government investigating body. When a
question arises as to whether the financial institution has taken suffi-
cient steps to satisfy the "know your customer" requirement or has
information that triggers the "suspicious transaction" reporting re-
quirement, the factual scenario can be submitted to the board for an
opinion, without invading the customer's privacy by divulging
his/her identity. The opinion, issued by experts in the field after col-
lective consideration and discussion of the facts, would then provide
financial institutions guidance with respect to their ensuing responsi-
bilities without making them the police. Moreover, the opinions of
this body would, over time, provide guidance and uniformity in ana-
lyzing and developing guidelines regarding acceptable conduct that
will be helpful not only to banks but also to customers. Indeed, indi-
viduals also ought to have access to the experts to obtain advice re-
garding appropriate conduct in the international financial system.
The clearinghouse can operate at the international level or at a re-
gional level and it can simply become part of the existing interna-
tional and regional initiatives.
Finally, governments must be made responsible for their ac-
tions. First, governments must clearly articulate the nexus of any ac-
countable investigated actions to objectionable conduct. For
example, if a particular activity is a business practice in a foreign ju-
risdiction, the investigating government's subjective view that such
conduct is indicia of proscribed conduct should not be elevated to
being proof of the proscribed acts. A clear example is the United
States view of parallel market money exchanges in South America.
While in the United States such conduct might not be acceptable, the
United States should not be able to deem the conduct unacceptable
regardless of where it takes place - money exchange in a grey mar-
ket is acceptable and appropriate business conduct in many foreign
jurisdictions. Similarly, governments must have "admissible" proof
of wrongdoing before they are allowed to proceed with forfeiture
actions or take advantage of available provisional remedies. Victims
of overzealous government actions should have access to relief.
Governments should be liable to individuals for unwarranted intru-
sions into their privacy.
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Implementation of these seven proposals will have a de minimis
effect on anti-drug enforcement initiatives while going a long way to
protect the right of privacy. Banks will have a source of guidance
that will largely eradicate over-reporting instincts. Governments will
rightfully bear the burden of showing wrongdoing before proceed-
ing with actions and this will curtail ill-founded fishing expeditions.
TheJos~s and Mariis who travel the international financial world will
enjoy a higher level of protection.
VIII. Conclusion,
It is apparent from the discussed approaches to the fight against
drug trafficking and money laundering that the privacy protection of
individuals has come full circle. Initially, states such as Switzerland
and the United Kingdom zealously protected individuals' privacy
based on bank secrecy rules that articulated the individuals' rights.
Privacy rights were protected to such an extent that, based on no-
tions of sovereignty and comity, states would enact blocking statutes
to impede access by foreign sovereigns, notably the United States, to
"private" information located within their borders. With the war on
drugs, this state protection of individuals succumbed to the need for
international cooperation with, respect to the transfer of information
between and among sovereigns that might well include some "pri-
vate" information. Sovereignty, too, has ceded to information shar-
ing initiatives. The pendulum has swung too far. The blueprint
described in part VII provides a more acceptable balance.
The United States and its Western European allies have acted
rapidly to criminalize drug-related money laundering. The efforts
have included the establishment of instrumentalities to monitor, in-
vestigate and eradicate money laundering by way of international
and regional agreements. These agreements provide mutual legal
assistance, including more efficient and rapid extradition; monitor-
ing of cash movements; enhanced enforcement by providing for the
ultimate forfeiture and the interim seizure of assets suspected to be
involved in, or are the fruits of, covered- transactions. In addition,
broad information share is available through record keeping and re-
porting requirements imposed on banks and their employees, in-
cluding encouragement to report and protection against liability
regarding reporting of "suspicious customer transactions" - trans-
actions that may be so classified depending on the nationality of ac-
tors, the type of transaction, or the volume of money, regardless of
the tenuous nexus to venal drug trafficking activity. Bank secrecy,
and consequently privacy, ceases to be a governmental concern in a
money laundering investigation.
Thus, bank secrecy and the right to financial privacy, as well as
sovereignty principles, are subordinated to the need to obtain infor-
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mation concerning possible drug money laundering activities. The
trend internationally is clearly not to stop at drug-related money
laundering, but to criminalize money laundering where it is related
to other kinds of serious criminal activity. If this trend continues,
financial institutions simply will be another branch of government
enforcement agencies, with bankers deputized as pseudo-cops. In
the end, the fundamental human right of privacy is hopelessly
endangered.
In this context, it should be recalled that the legislative history
of the United States legislation is clear: negligent involvement is
not, and ought not. be, punishable. This is the supposed safety net
for innocent individuals whose fungible money accidentally becomes
tied to dirty money. However, as the domestic and international laws
have evolved, mere indicia of illegality is sufficient evidence for
reaching out and invading an individual's privacy.
A gravely disconcerting problem is the nature of the indicia used
to focus on, or to point to, the individual's involvement. The use of
such indicia by the United States historically has been trouble-
some3 90 because the concepts underlining the nature of illegality in
different jurisdictions are not always completely compatible. Yet,
notwithstanding the past global disdain for the United States' over-
reaching approach, rather than eschew notions of guilt by indicia,
fellow combatants in the drug war have embraced these notions.
This notion of indicia - that which is or might be wrong, not
under fact-finding standards, but under skewed presumptions - is
paramount in dealing with international drug trafficking and money
laundering problems. In this context, the scienter standard of the
United States forfeiture laws, now being incorporated in the interna-
tional arena, will not protect any legitimate business person from
persecution. Regrettably, the use by the United States of its forfei-
ture laws can easily result in a business person being entangled in a
seamless web where the knowledge requirement is met simply be-
cause of the surrounding circumstances. This concern is now
greater because of the expanded forfeiture provisions in the interna-
tional sphere where the lessons that may be learned from the prob-
lematic United States experience ought to be considered.
Under United States law, once the assets are frozen, it is the
onus of the property owner to establish that there indeed is no nexus
between the property and the proscribed activity or that s/he is an
"innocent owner," i.e., if there is a nexus to the proscribed activity it
was without the owner's knowledge or consent. Either way, to free
her/his property an owner must establish a negative which is a vir-
390 See, e.g., notes 121-126 and accompanying text (describing the attempted use of
indicia by the United States in prosecuting securities and tax violations).
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tual impossibility. Some international initiatives are incorporating
this approach.
Moreover, a legitimate business person may find him/herself in
the unenviable position of having to come forth and disprove a gov-
ernment case which may well be based on hearsay and indicia of
wrongdoing. These circumstances can be exacerbated when, as is
often the case, the person whose assets were frozen is from a differ-
ent culture with different customs and ways of conducting business.
These simple differences may become absolute proof of wrongdoing.
Such circumstances, compounded by the fact that the individual's ac-
tivity no longer enjoys privacy protection, places the individual in an
untenable lose-lose proposition in which s/he can neither prove a
negative nor claim the protection of privacy.
This emerging international anti-money laundering scheme has
eroded the right to financial privacy beyond acceptable levels.
Throughout the globe, exceptions have been imposed on the previ-
ously sacred right to financial privacy while embracing indicia of cul-
pability. Pursuant to the requirements to "know your customer" and
to evaluate transactions for their "suspicious" nature, professionals
in financial institutions must invade their customers' privacy or
themselves be subject to punishment.
For example, with respect to the "know your customer" require-
ment, financial institutions must keep detailed information about
customers and their transactions. In the United States and Australia,
the information not only must be obtained but it also must be trans-
mitted to financial enforcement agencies who compare the informa-
tion against computerized information and can then use it as the
basis for further investigations. Other countries have proposed
more limited types of customer identification requirements. But
even Switzerland, historically the leading money laundering center,
no longer allows registered intermediaries, such as lawyers and ac-
countants, to accept money on behalf of clients without disclosing
the identity or the needs of such clients.
Similarly, professionals and their employees are obligated to re-
port so-called suspicious transactions. Failure to report such trans-
actions may subject the persons to criminal penalties. This
requirement eliminates, among other things, the traditional attor-
ney-client-like privilege, whereby bankers and professionals nor-
mally did not inquire into transactions and the background of their
clients. In this respect, the use of indicia to establish the suspicious
nature of the transaction is troublesome, particularly in light of the
absence of any evidence that all these intrusive governmental actions
are having any impact at all on the drug trade.
It is evident that both at the national and international level, na-
tions have to take steps to curb and eventually eliminate the destruc-
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tive activities of drug trafficking and money laundering. However, it
is apparent also that in so doing at a global scale, states have over-
stepped appropriate bounds and thus have trammelled the right of
privacy. The proposal set forth above provides a balanced approach
which permits law enforcement initiatives while protecting individual
privacy rights. The importance of both the government interest in
drug related interdictions and personal privacy rights warrants such
an approach. International efforts must have a global perspective
rather than an insular perspective. States must develop understand-
ings of each others cultures and practices in order to deal effectively
with each other and, consequently, with international ills. Some of
the international efforts take this route and the United States should
follow suit; all should remember and protect the precious origins of
individual privacy rights.
Postcript
After this Article was typeset for publication, former President
Bush quietly signed into law the "death penalty" legislation dis-
cussed above at notes 161 through 168 and accompanying text. Sur-
prisingly, this new act, promulgated to supplement all existing anti-
money laundering statutes was passed as part of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106
Stat. 3672 (1992).
The death penalty legislation adopted the House version of the
bill by providing that a financial institution may lose the ability to do
business in the United States only if there is an actual conviction for
a money laundering or Bank Secrecy Act violation. The Charters of
U.S. banks may be revoked, the deposit insurance of state banks may
be revoked, and the state branches and agencies of foreign banks
may be terminated. To this end, the law considers five factors similar
to the ones suggested by the House bill.
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